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The political systems of many Western, democratic countries are undergoing large changes. 
Particular issues are taking on greater prominence. Cooperation and compromise are becoming 
more difficult. And, arguably, we are seeing the resurgence of “populist” styles of politics. This 
dissertation, comprised of three papers, aims to show how personality is involved in some of 
these changes taking place. 
 
My first paper focuses on immigration attitudes in the UK and investigates how people with 
different personalities respond to rising levels of immigrants in their local areas. I show that 
the likely response is dependent both on the immigrant group, as well as one’s personality. 
Moreover, I found evidence that openness and extraversion may moderate the effects of local 
immigrant levels. 
 
My second paper, co-authored with Royce Carroll and Hanna Bäck, continues the research into 
immigration attitudes in the UK. Focusing on authoritarianism, we show that ‘right-wing 
authoritarianism’ is very strongly associated with immigration attitudes – much more so than 
competing measures, such as ‘social dominance orientation’, left-right placement, and even a 
measure of explicit prejudice. We also show that authoritarianism predicts a large preference 
for culturally similar immigrant groups, especially among high-skill immigrants.  
 
My third paper turns to a new issue: affective polarization. I argue that personality may 
influence out-party hostility in a number of ways. Due to the wide variety of media choices 
available, personality may influence media selection, indirectly impacting levels of hostility. 






may directly drive levels of hostility. While I did not find evidence of a moderation effect, 
personality traits were found to both influence media selection and directly impact levels of 
affective polarization 
 
These three papers demonstrate the importance of one’s disposition to many of the emerging 



























“Der Mensch kann zwar tun, was er will, aber er kann nicht wollen, was er will.” 
Arthur Schopenhauer 
 
My family argues about politics – often quite heatedly. At large family gatherings it would not 
be uncommon to hear raised voices and even mild insults. We are roughly split between 
relatively moderate Republicans and relatively moderate Democrats. In the past, nothing much 
came of these arguments. Topics would be changed, passions would dissipate, and we would 
leave each other with no hard feelings. This has since changed. Now some members of my 
family refuse to talk to others. Now the discussions are filled with an anger and desperation I 
do not recognize from earlier times. These family dynamics appear not to be unique to my 
family (see, e.g., Chen and Rohla, 2018). This overall rise in temperature demonstrates one of 
the phenomena I analyze in this dissertation: affective polarization.  However, it also represents 
a larger shift in politics today. The discussions cover different ground. Different issues are 
focused on. Ideologically, some members of the family have become more extreme. And the 
overall salience of politics has risen dramatically. When I visit home, I am struck by the fact 
that cable news seems to be playing in the background at all times, and some family members 
struggle to find topics to discuss other than politics. 
 
This dissertation hopes to contribute to our understanding of these changes by focusing on 
personality. How does one’s disposition influence political attitudes relevant to these changes 
we are seeing today? I have wondered for a long time why it is that some in my family seem 
“naturally” more conservative, and others “naturally” more liberal, despite very similar 






become more extreme in their views, and how the general emphasis put on politics has 
increased dramatically. Why have some become so impassioned by the issues which are 
relevant today? While there has been a deluge of research into affective polarization (for an 
overview, see: Iyengar et al., 2019), very little research has focused on this phenomenon 
through a psychological lens. Yet this is clearly psychological in nature. It also ought to be 
seen as tied to the ideological transformations we are seeing. My dissertation aims to help 
explain how who we are as individuals, psychologically, is connected to the stances we take in 
this politically tumultuous world we find ourselves in.  
 
A shifting world 
 
The changes we are seeing are not necessarily uniform around the globe. Different countries 
face different issues, have different political cultures and histories, and naturally therefore are 
undergoing different changes. Some of the shifts we are seeing may be unconnected to others. 
However, there is strong evidence that these changes exhibit an underlying pattern – and 
therefore a general shift. In the United States, Hetherington and Weiler (2009) have argued we 
are seeing a polarization between the parties based on authoritarianism. In Europe, there is 
evidence that similar changes are taking place (e.g., Dalton, 2018; Scotto et al., 2018; Surridge, 
2018).  
 
One of the key issues in this divide is immigration. In Europe, immigration has been a major 
point of contention, leading to the growth of many anti-immigration parties. In the UK, Brexit 
was dominated by the question of immigration (e.g., Clery et al., 2017). And Donald Trump 
famously declared his candidacy by talking about the threats posed by illegal Mexican 






become salient in recent years. The MeToo movement, Black Lives Matter, the discussion of 
Trans rights – all of these may represent a shift towards issues along this authoritarian axis, and 
not the traditional economically-focused left-right one. The salience and at times polarization 
around these issues does not imply, however, that the views at both poles have become more 
extreme. Americans, for instance, are less racist and more accepting of homosexuals than they 
were in recent memory (e.g., Charlesworth and Banaji, 2019). However, the divisions around 
these issues have become much more important to understanding the overall structure of 
contemporary political alignment.  
 
This dissertation focuses on two related elements of these shifts. First, immigration attitudes. 
As discussed above, immigration has become a major issue with large practical significance 
for many countries. The enormity of the issue of immigration may partly lie in shifting attitudes 
towards it, but also may be due to the ideological sorting on the issue which has taken place 
among parties in many countries. The second focus is on affective polarization. Affective 
polarization represents the growing dislike between members of political parties, especially the 
two major parties in the United States (Iyengar et al., 2012). These two should not be treated 
as completely separate phenomena, however. Affective polarization may be driven by a 
growing moralizing around political issues (Garrett and Bankert, 2020), with immigration 
representing a prominent example of a moralized issue. The point is not to claim that affective 
polarization and immigration attitudes are two sides of the same coin. Rather, these both 
represent highly important and interconnected examples of the kinds of polarization we are 









A focus on disposition 
 
There are likely a number of environmental causes for these changes we are seeing. With regard 
to immigration, a backlash against rising levels of immigration likely plays a large role 
(Schneider, 2008). With regard to affective polarization, I argue there is much evidence that 
changes in media play a large role (see, e.g., Garrett et al., 2014; Hmielowski et al., 2016; 
Hopkins and Ladd, 2013; Lau et al., 2016; Lelkes et al., 2017; Levendusky, 2013; Stroud, 2010). 
That said, these explanations are hardly exhaustive. However, if some environmental causes 
lie behind these changes, why does this dissertation focus on personality? I am not arguing that 
we are witnessing mass shifts in personality. What I am arguing is that personality may dispose 
one to favor one side or the other of some debate. More to the point, if there is a shift occurring 
in public opinion from divisions based around left-right economic divisions, to divisions 
around cultural and identity-based issues, it may be that one’s personality can take on a larger 
role in determining where one stands.  
 
The argument put forward by Hetherington and Weiler (2009), that we are witnessing a move 
towards cleavage along authoritarianism, represents just such an increase in importance for 
personality. Furthermore, as I will argue, one’s personality may either exaggerate or minimize 
the effect of some of these external forces. How much one is influenced by rising immigration 
levels, or how much one is affected by a changing media environment, is in part due to what 
kind of personality you have. This kind of dynamic can be seen in the work by Feldman and 
Stenner (1997), which argues that those with an authoritarian predisposition may become 
“activated” when presented with certain forms of societal threat. Thus, one should not think of 






it is relevant to consider how they may work in concert – how one’s disposition influences the 
way one responds to the environmental forces we encounter. 
 
Measures of personality 
 
One’s personality, or disposition, represents the tendencies towards particular emotions or 
behaviors that we have. As a general measure of personality, this dissertation uses the ‘Big 
Five’. The Big Five, also known as the five-factor model, is a trait-based taxonomy of 
personality. It was developed through factor-analytic techniques over a period of decades. By 
using factor analysis, the goal was to objectively develop a measure of personality, absent 
whatever biases the researchers may have.1 
 
The five factors are: openness to experience (or just openness), conscientiousness, extraversion, 
agreeableness, and neuroticism (also called by its opposite: emotional stability). Openness 
represents how open to new ideas one is, how willing to try new things, as well as how 
imaginative or artistic one is. Conscientiousness represents how rule-following one is, how 
structured one is, and perhaps represents a general ability to control one’s emotions (Davis and 
Panksepp, 2018). Extraversion represents how gregarious and outgoing a person is. 
Agreeableness represents how friendly and empathetic a person is. And finally, neuroticism 




1 For a lengthy history of the development of the Big Five, combined with a focus on its 






Since its development, the Big Five has risen in prominence considerably within psychology. 
It is currently the most widely used personality scale in psychology (John et al., 2008). It has 
been replicated numerous times, including in many different countries (see, e.g., Schmitt et al., 
2007). Research has found that personality is highly heritable, with a genetic influence of about 
40-50% (Bouchard, 2004). While it continues to subtly change throughout our lives, it is overall 
very stable (Caspi, Roberts and Shiner, 2005). This is not to say that this measure is without 
criticism. There have indeed been numerous critiques of this measure (e.g., Block, 2010). 
However, its consistency, lack of strong competitors, and associations with relevant variables 
of interest have likely kept it in good stead.  
 
In political research, the Big Five has been used for several decades and has been used in 
hundreds of studies. It has been consistently found to predict relevant political attitudes and 
behaviors. The strongest and most consistent associations have been between openness and 
left-wing attitudes, and between conscientiousness and right-wing attitudes (Gerber et al., 
2011b; Jost et al., 2009). However, as will be discussed in the following chapters, all of the 
traits have been found to be relevant for political outcomes.  
 
This dissertation takes an expansive view of personality. Many political measures, I would 
argue, have an element of personality which should not be discounted. If personality is our 
tendency to feel certain emotions and do certain behaviors, many aspects of politics would 
seem to be included in that. Similar to the innate tendencies that are captured by the Big Five, 
it seems undeniable that people have innate senses for certain political values. However, these 
are likely far more adaptable and driven by external factors such as culture and argumentation 
than Big Five traits. That does not mean that there are no inborn feelings towards justice or 






instance, will reject payments in cucumber, which they previously accepted, if they see a 
neighboring monkey receive grapes for the same task (Brosnan and De Waal, 2003).2 One can 
imagine a scale between those personality traits which are totally nonpolitical – “pure 
personality” – if you will, and those which are highly value-based. The ones on the value side 
of the scale will be much strongly associated with political outcomes. However, they will risk 
problems of endogeneity. That is not to say though that there is no innate sense there. There 
likely is, and it likely varies, much as with “pure” personality measures. To truly understand 
how one’s unique makeup influence political attitudes and behavior, attempts have to be made 
to understand the innate political sides of our personality.  
 
One of the first attempts at understanding the role of personality in politics, was in fact a form 
of value-based personality. In the wake of the Second World War, Adorno and colleagues 
wanted to understand why some individuals were drawn to authoritarian leaders and politics. 
They developed, in the ‘Authoritarian Personality’ (Adorno et al., 1950), a way to measure this 
tendency towards authoritarianism. However, the work later came under methodological 
criticism (Martin, 2001) leading to the ambition becoming largely abandoned by researchers. 
This ambition, however, was revived in the 1980s, through the development of the ‘right-wing 
authoritarianism’ scale (RWA) (Altemeyer, 1981). A version of this scale is used in this 
dissertation. RWA has much the same aims as the original Authoritarian Personality, avoiding 
some of the methodological pitfalls.  
 
RWA uses a number of value- and political-based questions to assess the underlying 
personality trait. As the items are partly political, there is naturally the risk of endogeneity. 
Therefore, other researchers have sought to measure this trait with alternative methodologies, 
 






most notably through ‘Child-Rearing Values’. This scale was employed in the work of 
Hetherington and Weiler (2009), discussed above. There is still debate about which measure is 
better at capturing the underlying trait, while balancing risks of endogeneity – however, this 
dissertation does not take a position on that debate. While RWA may be considered quite far 
on the value-side of the personality dimension, it has still been found to correlate with a number 
of Big Five traits (e.g., Ekehammer et al., 2004; Perry and Sibley, 2012; Sibley and Duckitt, 
2009), perhaps signaling that these two sets of measures have some overlap in what innate 
tendencies they are tapping. Additionally, research has found that RWA is partially heritable 
(Kandler et al., 2016), indicating that variation in one’s value-based personality may indeed be, 
to a certain extent, inborn. 
 
This research project 
 
Using these two measures of personality, the Big Five and RWA, this dissertation hopes to 
help explain the role of disposition in the changes which are taking place right now politically. 
By examining two issues, and using these two scales, I hope to approach this task from a 
number of different angles. And I believe these approaches to be complementary. As there are 
different elements to the changes we are witnessing, we are likely to see associations with 
various personality traits and measures. Moreover, while some of the relationships are direct, 
other relationships are indirect. These indirect relationships may involve traits that influence 
nonpolitical behaviors, choices, and reactions, which have subsequent political consequences. 
It would be a mistake to focus solely on the most “political” of personality traits. By applying 
this strategy, I hope to get a fuller account of how one’s personality may be relevant to 
understanding the transformations we are seeing today. I will now discuss the research studies 








Chapter Two, “Divergent Responses to Local Diversity: Outgroup differences and the impact 
of personality”, examines how both one’s personality, as well as the immigrant makeup in 
one’s local area can influence attitudes towards immigration. There are three main questions 
which are examined. First, how does one’s personality, as measured using the Big Five, predict 
overall immigration attitudes? Second, how does the makeup of one’s local area influence 
attitudes? And finally, how does one’s personality moderate the effects of local immigrant 
levels?  
 
To answer these questions, I relied primarily on the first wave of the British Election Study’s 
(BES) online panel and the 2011 British censuses. From the BES I combined two general 
questions about the effects of immigrants on the economy and on the culture. Though much 
research has been devoted to the question of whether people are more concerned with the 
economic or cultural effects of immigration (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; Sides and Citrin, 
2007; Sniderman et al., 2004), in this sample, the two measures were highly correlated. 
Combining them also provided a good overall measure of immigration attitudes. The BES 
collects information about the respondents’ local areas, so that allowed the data to be merged 
with British census data.  
 
From the census I was able to get measures of the number of immigrants from particular groups 
that live in the respondents’ local areas. I focused on three distinct groups, to assess the impacts 
of different forms of immigration. These were: Western European immigrants, Eastern 






models with random intercepts at the local area level, and regressed immigration attitudes on 
personality and local immigrant levels, with demographic and ideological controls. 
 
There were several core findings. First, of the Big Five traits, openness and conscientiousness 
had the biggest effects on immigration attitudes. Second, the effect of immigrants in one’s local 
area depends on the group in question. While living near Western European immigrants is 
associated with more supportive attitudes, living near Muslim immigrants is associated with 
greater hostility. Third, these effects seem to be moderated by openness and extraversion. More 
open and extraverted individuals become more positive towards immigration as the percent of 
immigrants in their local area increases. This is likely due to a contact effect, though it was not 
measured in the study. Notably, this moderation effect did not vary substantially with the group 
in question.  
 
This study builds on several different literatures, bringing them together to make some unique 
contributions. 
 
First, this adds to the small, but growing, literature on the relationships between Big Five traits 
and attitudes to immigration (e.g., Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018; Dinesen et al., 
2016; Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014). Notably, this study finds that the two strongest 
associations between Big Five traits and immigration attitudes are with the traits of openness 
and conscientiousness, with neuroticism close behind. This somewhat differs from other work 
in this area, indicating the importance of context in these personality studies. The relationships 
between personality traits and certain attitudes may depend on local circumstances, including 







Second, it contributes to general research on immigration and contact theory (Allport, 1954). 
While much research collapses immigration groups, this study shows that living in areas with 
different immigrant groups present has different effects on immigration attitudes. More 
culturally distant groups provoke more hostility than less culturally distant groups. This is 
especially relevant when considering contact. While evidence indicates that contact between 
groups leads to more positivity (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), more culturally distant groups 
may face both greater initial hostility, and a lower probability of the kind of integration which 
leads to contact in the first place. This study lends further evidence that this process is 
moderated by openness and extraversion, which is in contrast with Ackermann, Ackermann 
and Freitag (2018) and Ackermann and Ackermann (2015). They found that in areas with 
higher levels of diversity, the relationship between conscientiousness and hostile attitudes was 
attenuated. The differing findings in these studies may indicate that the findings are brittle, or 




Chapter Three, “Authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes in the UK”, co-authored with 
Royce Carroll and Hanna Bäck, continues the look into UK immigration attitudes. Unlike the 
previous study, here we attempted to clearly distinguish between the economic and cultural 
sides of immigration. Our goal was to examine the relationships between RWA and these 
aspects of immigration attitudes. We wished, furthermore, to isolate the effects of RWA from 
related measures, such as ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO) and explicit prejudice, as well 







We launched an original survey in the UK,3 which included an original grid-instrument which 
asked respondents to indicate their immigration preference levels (more, fewer, same amount) 
for immigrants from different regions and skill levels.  
 
We found that RWA was by far the strongest predictor of hostility towards immigration. 
Furthermore, the effect of RWA varied strongly between immigrant origins, but not skill levels. 
This differentiation was greater than that found with competing measures, even including the 
measure of explicit prejudice. These findings strengthen those in Chapter Two, indicating that 
it is worth distinguishing attitudes towards different immigrant groups. This study shows that 
this differentiation is driven most strongly by authoritarianism.  
 
Authoritarianism can be seen as a tendency to put group interests, stability and norms above 
individual desires (Duckitt, 1989). Putting the group before the individual helps explain 
associations with immigration attitudes (Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), 
as well as, more fundamentally, prejudice (e.g., Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammer et al., 2014; 
Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). That said, that these findings are stronger with RWA than with 
explicit prejudice, implies the associations between RWA and immigration attitudes are not 
being driven by these prejudicial attitudes.  
 
To help identify the aspects of RWA which are most closely linked with the main findings, we 
created scales based on the three components of RWA: ‘aggression’, ‘conventionalism’, and 
‘submission’ (Funke 2005). We found that the results were driven most strongly by aggression. 
Aggression represents most clearly the “law and order” side of authoritarianism. It taps the 
punitive side of authoritarianism. These findings, taken together, indicate that more 
 






authoritarian individuals are threatened primarily by the cultural side of immigration, and this 
effect is stronger for groups perceived to be more culturally threatening. That these 
relationships, however, are not largely mediated by prejudice, both represents a contribution to 
the literature, as well as indicates a great need for further research to explore these relationships 
in more depth, and ideally with other methodologies. 
 
This study also contributes to the general immigration literature by demonstrating the key role 
authoritarianism plays in heightened concern towards culturally distant immigrant groups. 
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2015) argued there was great agreement in the US about what type 
of immigrant was most favored – with little variation due to political affiliation. We find that 
in the UK party as well as left-right placement have little impact on immigrant origin preference, 
while there is a very large impact from RWA. Strictly speaking, it could be that here too there 
is a general consensus on the ideal immigrant type. However, we have found that preferences 
for ideal levels vary considerably by immigrant group. And crucially, that variation is most 
strongly associated with one’s level of authoritarianism.  
 
Put together, this chapter demonstrates the heavy importance of one measure of personality – 




Chapter Four, “Individually Informed: Personality, news consumption, and affective 
polarization”, returns to the Big Five and examines its role in both media consumption and 
affective polarization. I argue in the chapter that personality may have an increasing effect on 






available, people’s disposition ought to play a larger role than it did before, when choices were 
more limited.  
 
This chapter examines three possible routes through which personality may influence affective 
polarization. The first is with news consumption as a mediator. Personality may influence 
media selection, and this subsequent consumption will itself influence levels of affective 
polarization. The second is through moderating media consumption. The same consumption 
patterns may have differential effects, depending on who is doing the consuming. Finally, 
personality may directly affect levels of affective polarization. To examine these routes, an 
original survey was launched using the Prolific platform in December of 2019.4  
 
This line of thought builds on several growing literatures.  
 
There has been much recent research implicating news consumption in levels of affective 
polarization (e.g., Garrett et al., 2014; Hmielowski et al., 2016; Hopkins and Ladd, 2013; Lau 
et al., 2016; Lelkes et al., 2017; Levendusky, 2013). With the emergence of cable news and 
then internet news, there are many more partisan voices available. Evidence indicates people 
are drawn to news which confirms their viewpoints (Iyengar and Hahn 2009). As news 
organizations often focus on divisive, negative news stories, to draw in consumers, this 
selective exposure could be having a magnified effect on out-party hostility. This hostility has 
indeed been found to be driven more by negative portrayals of the other side, than positive 
portrayals of one’s own (Smith and Searles, 2014).  
 
 






Personality has also been shown to impact news consumption generally (Gerber et al., 2011a; 
Mondak, 2010), as well as the partisan make up of news consumption (Kim and Kim, 2018), 
and preferences for negative news (Bachleda et al., 2020). Additionally, one’s personality 
appears to have direct impacts on levels of affective polarization (Webster, 2018). With this 
study I wished to bring these different strands of research together. I used a longer personality 
battery to, ideally, get a better measure of personality than commonly used 10-item measures. 
I also asked the respondents about their attitudes towards the news, to get a fuller understanding 
of how they perceived and interacted with the news, beyond merely its ideological composition. 
Finally, I had the respondents read either a supportive or hostile editorial about the opposing 
party. This was to directly see how one’s personality impacted the effects of and attitudes 
towards polarizing content. As the relevant aspect of affective polarization is hostility towards 
the other side, out-party hostility was focused on specifically, and not the difference between 
judgements of the two parties. 
 
Going back to the three routes I sketched out above, I found that extraversion predicts higher 
levels of news consumption – and news consumption from all sides of the political spectrum. 
Open individuals were likely to claim they made an effort to consume media from the other 
side, however their reported consumption did not support this. Agreeable individuals were most 
likely to have homogenous news consumption patterns. The partisan balance of reported 
consumption patterns showed a clear relationship with out-party hostility. Similarly, reading a 
supportive or hostile editorial about the opposing party decreased and increased out-party 
hostility, respectively. These relationships, however, were not moderated by personality. That 
said, personality traits did directly predict levels of out-party hostility. Agreeableness and 







These results show that personality has an impact on both news consumption patterns and 
affective polarization, however the findings are mixed. Some relationships are not very strong, 
while others are somewhat inconsistent. These weaknesses may be partly due to measurement 
issues (e.g., reported rather than actual news consumption), however it may also indicate that 
other aspects of one’s personality play a larger role in this dynamic than the Big Five. Future 
research into news consumption patterns should utilize other forms of personality before 




These three research projects illustrate that different aspects of one’s personality play important 
roles in current political dynamics and schisms. I show that personality not only directly 
influences these phenomena, but also indirectly influences them. This is a complex picture and 
therefore I am using my conclusion, Chapter Five, to discuss some of the larger ideas which 
















2. Divergent Responses to Local Diversity: Outgroup differences and the 
impact of personality 
 
Recent research has shown that differences in personality can help explain support or hostility 
towards immigration. Personality differences may also be related to the likelihood of contact 
with immigrant groups, as well as the effect of that contact. Using attitudinal measures from 
the British Election Study, this research confirms the importance of personality in predicting 
immigration attitudes. Furthermore, it shows that the effects of two Big Five traits, openness 
and extraversion, depend on the concentration of immigrants at a local level. In areas with high 
levels of immigrants, these traits more strongly associate with supportive attitudes. This may 
be due to more open and extraverted individuals having greater levels of contact with 
immigrants. Moreover, by looking at local concentrations of Western European immigrants, 
Eastern European immigrants, and immigrants from predominantly Muslim countries, this 
study shows that only greater concentrations of Western European immigrants are associated 
with increases in immigration support, while in contrast, greater concentrations of immigrants 
from Muslim countries are associated with increases in hostility. These findings demonstrate 
that how individuals respond to local immigration levels is likely to depend both on their 
personality and the immigrant group in question.  
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Immigration has become central to many contemporary political debates, and anti-immigration 
parties and politicians have risen to prominence in many countries. The unprecedented UK 
vote to leave the European Union, for example, was largely fueled by fears over immigration 
(Clery et al., 2017). This growing salience of immigration may be a consequence of increased 
immigration levels, a backlash effect. How one responds to changes in immigration levels, 
however, is not uniform. This paper focuses on the impacts of local immigration levels in the 
UK. I argue that the way one responds to rising numbers of immigrants in their local area will 
greatly depend on both their own personality, as well as the origin of the immigrants. 
 
Personality, which shapes our behavior and emotions, is likely to impact how we respond to 
changes in our neighborhood. It has been shown to strongly shape our general political attitudes 
(Mondak, 2010) and, more recently, been found to predict prejudice and immigration attitudes 
(e.g., Akrami et al., 2011; Dinesen et al., 2016; Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014; Sibley and 
Duckitt, 2008). This should not be surprising, as we know that prejudice and immigration 
attitudes are linked to emotional reactions (Brader et al., 2008). Beyond this, one’s personality 
has been shown to impact friendships and contact networks (Harris and Vazire, 2016; Selden 
and Goodie, 2018), which is particularly relevant for immigration attitudes.  
 
As the concentration of immigrants increases in a local area, there is an increased chance of 
contact between members of the majority community and immigrants. Contact theory (Allport, 
1954) argues that these interactions, especially close ones, should reduce prejudice and hostility 
towards the minority group. A meta-analysis of the large literature on this subject found that 






impersonal contact can improve relations (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). However, positive 
responses to contact are not a given, and some studies have indeed found increases in prejudice 
and hostility from contact (Enos, 2014, Hopkins et al., 2014; Johnston et al., 2015; Karreth et 
al., 2015; Quillian, 1995), supporting what we can call Conflict theory (Blumer, 1958). As 
areas become more diverse, one’s personality may begin to take up an even larger role in 
determining responses to these changes. We cannot expect all people to be equally likely to 
strike up a conversation or begin a new friendship with people from other countries and cultures. 
As personality affects so much, it seems unlikely to not impact patterns of contact. 
 
Whether contact takes place, or even how deep it is likely to be, is only part of the equation. 
We cannot assume everyone would interpret and be affected by the same experiences in the 
same way. If personality shapes how we behave and feel about the world, it is likely to 
influence reactions to the same experiences. What one person feels as threatening, might be 
exciting or enriching to another. Whether through contact patterns, or through different threat 
perceptions, research is beginning to find an interaction between immigration levels and 
personality (Ackermann and Ackermann, 2015; Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag, 2018; 
Danckert et al., 2017). This provides strong evidence that in more diverse environments the 
role of personality shifts. However, the interactions found in these studies differ. They differ 
in which traits were found to moderate the impact of diversity and contact, as well as whether 
the traits became more or less powerful in diverse environments. Some of this may be due to 
differences in datasets and methodology, however it also indicates that context may play a large 
role in determining response patterns.  
 
When considering distinct reactions to rising immigration numbers, personality is not the only 






particular group, but to simply understand that we should not expect that contact is equally 
likely, regardless of the origin of the immigrant group. Nor should we expect that the depth, 
quality, and positivity of the experience is equally likely. Research has shown that attitudes 
towards immigrants differ depending on the group (Brader et al., 2008; Dustmann and Preston, 
2007; Ford et al., 2012; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015), 
and while there has not been much research directly comparing the effects of contact with 
different ethnic groups, it seems unlikely that pre-existing beliefs are irrelevant to our 
expectations. The situation may arise that contact between those groups where it may be most 
beneficial in alleviating prejudices, may be least likely to occur, due to those same prejudices. 
One’s personality may then serve to exaggerate or dampen the effects of these pre-existing 
beliefs. 
 
Through analysis of personality and attitudinal measures from the British Election Study and 
government sources of local immigration data, this study helps us to disentangle some of these 
issues. This study specifically compares the effects of living near three different immigrant 
groups: Western European immigrants, Eastern European immigrants, and immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim countries. This differentiation allows the study to look at how contact 
effects may vary depending on the kind of outgroup in question.  
 
This study contributes to the literature in three main ways. First, it confirms the importance of 
personality as a determinant of immigration attitudes. Unlike other studies in this area, however, 
it finds the strongest predictors of immigration attitudes are openness and conscientiousness, 
reflecting the broader personality findings. Second, by modelling several immigrant groups 
together, it finds strong evidence that a distinction between immigrant groups is necessary. 






more positive attitudes toward immigration, no such relationship was found for Eastern 
European immigrants, and higher concentrations of immigrants from Muslim countries are 
associated with more negative attitudes towards immigration. Third, this study found evidence 
for an interaction between the traits of openness and extraversion, and immigrant 
concentrations. These interactions indicate that as immigration levels rise, irrespective of group, 
these traits have a larger impact on immigration attitudes, with those high in the traits becoming 
more positive towards immigration than those low on the traits. 
 
2.2 Immigrant Groups and Contact  
 
Initial attempts to understand immigration attitudes have focused on whether and to what extent 
these attitudes are determined by economic or cultural concerns (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 
2014; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Sniderman et al., 2004). Research has made it clear that while 
both are relevant to voters (e.g., Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015), cultural concerns seem to 
dominate in certain contexts (Card et al., 2012; Carey, 2002). Schneider (2008) argues that in 
Europe higher immigration levels do in general produce a backlash against immigration, and 
this is driven by cultural concerns and a fear of conflict over values, and not economic 
competition. This perceived conflict of values is likely connected to and strengthened by 
prejudice, which has also been associated with negative views towards immigration (e.g., 
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). 
 
This backlash effect is most apparent when looking at changes in immigration numbers, rather 
than overall levels. Kaufmann (2017) showed that, in the UK, areas with established minority 
ethnic groups were less hostile towards immigration and less likely to support UKIP. In contrast, 






hostile to immigration. These were longitudinal data, indicating this effect was not due to self-
selection. This effect could be due to two related phenomena. The first is that people become 
used to living around immigrants, and this gradually reduces perceived threats associated with 
them. The second is that, over time, people have more and more contact with immigrants, and 
this reduces perceived threats and prejudices.  
 
Contact theory (Allport, 1954) argues that hostilities and prejudices between groups should 
decrease as contact, and especially close contact, occurs between members of those groups. 
Though it was not originally developed with immigration as its focus, if prejudices and cultural 
fears are behind much of the hostility towards immigration, contact between members of the 
majority population and immigrants should lessen those concerns. A large number of studies 
have now indeed found that contact with immigrants is associated with less hostile attitudes 
(Ellison et al., 2011; Kokkonen et al., 2016; Laurence, 2014; McLaren, 2003; Savelkoul et al., 
2011; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010; Schneider, 2008). This is not necessarily causal, as one 
would expect those who are already less hostile to immigration would be more likely to 
befriend and associate with immigrants. However, Laurence (2014) shows that areas with more 
diversity have more interethnic ties, and both McLaren (2003) and Kokkonen et al. (2016) 
show an interaction between the percentage of immigrants in areas and contact. As immigration 
levels increase, attitudes diverge more and more between those who have immigrant contact 
and those who do not.   
 
This general trend, however, may vary by immigrant group. Different immigrant groups may 
be more or less likely to come into contact with the majority population, and they may also 
have different prejudices and cultural concerns associated with them. Cultural concerns, in 






2007; Ford et al., 2012; Hainmueller and Hangartner, 2013; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015). 
Potential culture clashes are not viewed as equally likely with all immigrant populations, and 
specific groups have specific concerns or fears attached to them. While long-term trends may 
follow the same pattern, how long to expect for a change to occur may vary, due to these issues. 
In other words, in order to be accepted, the hurdles may be higher for some immigrant groups. 
 
In this paper I distinguish between three immigrant groups, chosen as a way to contrast three 
very different forms of immigration, with different perceptions attached. Western European 
immigrants are culturally similar and are generally not viewed with much concern. In contrast, 
Eastern European immigrants came recently to the UK, have been a great source of low-skilled 
labor in the country, and are less accepted and assimilated. Immigrants from Muslim countries 
were chosen as the third group because they particularly are viewed with suspicion in the UK. 
A 2017 survey in the UK found that 52 percent of respondents agreed that “Islam poses a 
serious threat to Western civilisation”, 42 percent were more suspicious of Muslims as a result 
of recent terror attacks, and only 10 percent believed that Muslims were similar to themselves 
(HOPE not Hate, n.d.).  
 
Comparing different immigrant groups is important both because of how they are perceived, 
and how likely contact may be. That likelihood is further impacted by personality. How open 
we are, how extraverted we are, how friendly we are, all of these things and more may steer us 
either towards or away from meeting and forming friendships with immigrants in our 
communities. The same traits may also drive our perceptions of immigrants in the absence of 








2.3 Personality and Immigration Attitudes 
 
Personality is associated with political attitudes generally (Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak, 2010; 
Mondak et al., 2010), as well as immigration attitudes (e.g., Ackermann, Ackermann and 
Freitag 2018; Dinesen et al., 2016; Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014), and levels of prejudice 
(Akrami et al., 2011; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). Personality can be thought of as our general 
patterns of thinking, behaving, and feeling, and can be seen as a precursor to political attitudes 
(Block and Block, 2006; Mondak, 2010). The impact of local levels of immigration provides 
an example where personality is especially important to study, as the behavioral patterns 
associated with different personalities will likely impact the attitudinal effects of immigration. 
In the field of personality research, the Big Five is currently the major measurement construct 
for personality, used in the majority of psychological studies using personality (John et al., 
2008). This measure is composed of five traits: openness (or openness to experience), 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness and neuroticism (also called emotional 
stability). These traits are highly heritable (Bouchard, 2004) and quite stable throughout one’s 
life, though they do continuously change as one ages (Caspi et al., 2005).  
 
As the concentration of immigrants in one’s local area increases, it is likely that one’s 
personality will affect how one responds to that increase. In other words, there should be an 
interaction. There are two main ways this could occur. The first way is through threat 
perceptions.  Johnston et al. (2015) found that levels of authoritarianism predicted perceived 
threats in response to ethnic change and, similarly, Karreth et al. (2015, pp. 1) found that 
increasing diversity is “associated with negative attitudes towards, immigrants, but only among 
natives on the political right”. This dynamic seems likely to occur with personality as well. The 






then subsequently affect immigration attitudes. This will most likely be through contact. Our 
behavioral choices will make us more or less likely to come into contact with immigrants, and 
some of those choices will be driven by our personalities. Once we are in contact with 
immigrants, some of us will be more or less likely to befriend them, again, due to our 
personalities, and not necessarily our pre-existing attitudes towards immigration. 
 
Openness describes how curious people are and how open they are to new experiences. A high 
level of openness has been the most consistent Big Five predictor of left-wing views overall 
(Gerber et al., 2011b; Jost et al., 2009). Beyond that, it has been found to predict less-prejudicial 
views (Akrami et al., 2011; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008) as well as been associated with more 
tolerant and permissive views towards immigration (Ackermann and Ackermann, 2015; 
Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018; Dinesen et al., 2016; Freitag and Rapp, 2015; 
Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014; Ziller and Berning, 2019). Relatedly, it has been found to 
predict lower voting levels for a right-wing populist party (Ackermann, Zampieri and Freitag 
2018). Some evidence indicates openness predicts a larger friendship network (Harris and 
Vazire, 2016), and it has also been found linked to more new contacts as a percent of one’s 
network (Zhu et al., 2013), and more critically here, more interethnic friendships (Jackson and 
Poulsen, 2005; Laakasuo et al., 2017), as well as a more positive interpretation of those 
experiences (Jackson and Poulsen, 2005). It has also been found to interact with immigrant 
contact and subjective neighborhood diversity, increasing the effect of openness in those 
conditions (Danckert et al., 2017). We can be confident that openness will predict more positive 
views towards immigration. Although this has not been consistently found, it is reasonable to 
expect that as immigration levels rise, the effect of openness on attitudes may increase, as high-
open individuals may be more likely to have contact with immigrants, and have those 






Conscientiousness describes how rule-following and organized people are. A high level of 
conscientiousness is the most consistent Big Five predictor of right-wing views overall (Gerber 
et al., 2011b; Jost et al., 2009). As it is associated with upholding tradition and national unity, 
it is not a big surprise that it has also been found associated with anti-immigration views 
(Ackermann and Ackermann, 2015; Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018; Dinesen et al., 
2016; Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014; Ziller and Berning, 2019) as well as voting for a right-
wing populist party (Ackermann, Zampieri and Freitag 2018). It has been found to weakly 
predict prejudicial views, however that depends on the region of the world (Sibley and Duckitt, 
2008). As conscientiousness is generally not related to friendship or network size (Harris and 
Vazire, 2016; Selden and Goodie, 2018), it is unlikely that it will play a large role in contact 
patterns with immigrants. However, two studies from Switzerland found that perceived 
neighborhood diversity moderated the effect of conscientiousness on immigration attitudes 
(Ackermann and Ackermann, 2015; Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018). 
Conscientiousness only predicted hostile attitudes in less diverse areas. In more diverse areas 
the negative association disappeared. This is the opposite of what they predicted, as they 
predicted more diverse areas should be seen as more threatening to very conscientious 
individuals. It is reasonable that, for this trait, interactions with immigration levels could go in 
either direction. Those predisposed to hostility could become more hostile. Or, as areas become 
more diverse, they could find their fears and concerns mollified, through contact or otherwise. 
Both patterns may occur, but to different individuals. This may result, on the population level, 
with the effects essentially canceling each other out, or with the dominant effect depending on 
local conditions. As a result, there is no clear prediction for interactions involving this trait.  
 
Extraversion describes how socially outgoing an individual is. Research results regarding its 






correlate with right-wing views (Gerber et al., 2011b). It has not been found associated with 
prejudice (Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). However, it has been associated with anti-immigrant 
views (Freitag and Rapp, 2015) and voting for a right-wing populist party (Ackermann, 
Zampieri and Freitag 2018), although the majority of studies in this area did not find a 
significant effect related to immigration attitudes. On the other hand, extraversion is found to 
predict larger friendship and contact networks (Harris and Vazire, 2016; Selden and Goodie, 
2018; Zhu et al., 2013) and has been found to predict lower intergroup anxiety, through higher 
cross-group contact levels (Turner et al., 2014). Thus, while it seems unlikely that, on its own, 
extraversion will have a large impact on immigration attitudes, it is reasonable to expect that 
to change as immigration levels increase. In other words, extraversion may not have a strong 
intrinsic relationship with immigration attitudes, but through its role in contact networks and 
friendships, it may begin to predict positive attitudes as immigrant concentrations become 
larger. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect an interaction between extraversion and 
immigration levels.  
 
Agreeableness describes how friendly or empathetic an individual is. Although it is not a strong 
predictor of left- or right-wing views overall (e.g., Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak, 2010), it has 
been found to be associated with lower levels of prejudice (Akrami et al., 2011; Sibley and 
Duckitt, 2008), more supportive views towards immigration (Ackermann and Ackermann, 
2015; Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018; Dinesen et al., 2016; Freitag and Rapp, 2015; 
Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014; Ziller and Berning, 2019) and less support to a right-wing 
populist party (Ackermann, Zampieri and Freitag 2018). Agreeable individuals also are found 
to have larger networks (Harris and Vazire, 2016; Selden and Goodie, 2018; Zhu et al., 2013), 
lower intergroup anxiety (Turner et al., 2014), and more intergroup contact, with a more 






association between agreeableness and immigration attitudes increased, according to one study, 
in more diverse neighborhoods (Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018). This trait is likely 
to be a strong predictor of immigration attitudes, and also is likely to have a stronger effect as 
immigration increases, through increased contact levels with immigrants and/or a differential 
response to rising levels, with high-agreeable individuals being less threatened than low-
agreeable ones. 
 
Neuroticism indicates how sensitive to negative emotions one is. Overall, it is not as strong a 
predictor of overall left- or right-wing views as openness or conscientiousness, but higher 
levels of neuroticism tend to predict left-wing economic views (Gerber et al., 2011b), and the 
trait been associated with support for parties which provide “shelter against material or cultural 
challenges” (Schoen and Schumann, 2007, pp. 492). Like with conscientiousness, it has also 
been found to weakly correlate with prejudicial views, but only in some regions (Sibley and 
Duckitt, 2008). It has also been found in at least one study to predict anti-immigration attitudes 
(Gallego and Pardos-Prado, 2014). Neuroticism does not seem to have much bearing on the 
size of one’s network, but it does predict instability in current friendships (Harris and Vazire, 
2016) and may hinder friendship formation (Selden and Goodie, 2018). It is likely to have an 
association with anti-immigrant attitudes, however that may depend on context, as with its 
associations with prejudice. There is no clear prediction of an interaction with this trait with 
rising immigration levels. As with conscientiousness, it could be that increased immigration 
levels will exaggerate its effect, due to differing threat perceptions at the different ends of the 
traits, or it could diminish the concerns held by high-neuroticism individuals through normal 







Interactions between traits and immigration levels are likely to occur either through differential 
contact patterns, or different interpretations of experiences. Both are likely to occur to some 
degree. We can be more confident that, to the extent a trait predicts contact, higher immigration 
levels should increase the predictive power of the trait, as the more contact-prone side of the 
trait pulls farther away from the more reticent side. This sort of an interaction is most likely to 
occur for openness, extraversion, and agreeableness. Interactions dependent on the 
interpretation of experiences are harder to predict. Here it is reasonable to expect interactions 
in two directions. Those who are “naturally” more hostile to immigration may become even 
more hostile in the presence of immigrants, enlarging the effect of the trait. On the other hand, 
over time, as they get used to immigrants and have more contact with them (even if they did 
not seek it out), the perceived threat may lower, bringing the two sides of the trait closer 
together. This may be what occurred in Ackermann and Ackermann (2015) and Ackermann, 
Ackermann and Freitag (2018). It is worth considering that this can also run in the opposite 
direction. Perhaps those less prone towards hostility will have negative experiences, and the 
trait will lose predictive power as both sides become more similarly hostile. 
 
In this paper I distinguish between three immigrant groups. It is reasonable to expect that there 
will be overall more hostility towards more culturally distant groups. That said, it is not 
straightforward to predict how this will impact interactions. Groups that provoke less hostility 
may also be most likely to come into contact with the respondents, and the experiences may be 
closer and more positive. On the other hand, there may be less room for the experiences to have 
an effect, as attitudes towards those groups may be relatively positive to begin with. It may be 
the groups which provoke the most concern where contact could have the largest effect. 
Similarly, as a more threatening group increases in numbers, it is reasonable to assume that, 






trait have a more and more disparate response.  As a result of these complexities, this paper 
does not make any predictions about differences between group-personality interactions. 
Ideally though, what should be seen are consistent patterns.  
 
2.4 Research Design 
 
In order to investigate these issues, I combined several data sources. For data on political 
attitudes, as well as personality, I used Wave 1 of the internet panel of the British Election 
Study (Fieldhouse et al., 2014). This dataset contains information about the respondents’ local 
authority, which allowed me to merge it with data concerning these local authorities. Wave 1 
was used as it was closest in time to the latest census, which provides the most accurate data 
on immigrant distributions. Immigration and population data come from the 2001 and 2011 
censuses for England and Wales, and for Scotland (National Records of Scotland, 2020a, 2020b; 
Office for National Statistics, 2020a, 2020b). From the censuses, I used population totals, and 
immigrant totals for three groups of immigrants. Western European immigrants are those who 
come from countries which were members of the EU prior to 2001, Eastern European 
immigrants come from countries which joined the EU between 2001 and 2011, and immigrants 
from predominantly Muslim countries are those who came from the Middle East, North Africa, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh.5 Additionally, to control for the effects of the local economy, I used 
UK government estimates of unemployment for these local areas averaged over the year 2014 




5 There might be slight discrepancies in which countries are included in the Eastern European 
category between 2001 and 2011. This is unlikely to impact results in any large way – and the 






Table 1: Correlation matrix of immigrant population variables 
 
Variables     (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
(1) Western European Percent 1.00 
(2) Eastern European  Percent 0.53 1.00 
(3) Muslim Percent   0.45 0.49 1.00 
(4)Western European Change  0.85 0.48 0.48 1.00 
(5) Eastern European Change  0.32 0.93 0.39 0.30 1.00 
(6) Muslim Change   0.04 0.20 0.63 0.02 0.27 1.00 
 
Notes: Change represents percentage point change from 2001 to 2011. Correlations between 
percent and change measures for the same immigrant group are bolded. 
 
I used immigration data from 2001 in order to calculate the percentage point changes in each 
local authority for each immigrant group. This is because there may be a different effect of 
immigration change as there is for total immigrant shares (see, e.g., Kaufmann, 2017). However, 
as can be seen in Table 1, the correlations between the change variables and the percent 
variables for each group are quite high, indicating very similar relationships with the variables 
of interest. Indeed, that was what was found. Therefore, only the analysis for the immigration 
percent variables will be shown below. See the appendix for the results for the immigration 
change variables. 
 
Table 2 shows summary statistics for the different immigrant measures. As can be seen, the 
mean values for all measures are low, between 1 and 2 percent. However, the maximum values 
are generally quite high, reaching up to 16 percent, indicating a long tail in values. As this study 
focuses on how individuals of the majority population respond to living in areas with varying 
levels of non-UK born residents, I am restricting the sample to only those who are UK citizens 








Table 2: Summary statistics for immigrant population variables 
 
Variables    Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 
Western European Percent  1.44  1.27  0.33  14.52 
Eastern European  Percent  1.75  1.47  0.20  10.58  
Muslim Percent   1.44  2.05  0.06  17.01 
 
Notes: Observations omitted when NAs present for key variables in base models. N = 18,301. 
 
 
The outcome variable I am using, Immigration Attitudes is the mean of the Economic Effects 
and Cultural Effects variables. These questions ask the respondents: “Do you think immigration 
is good or bad for Britain’s economy?” and “And do you think that immigration undermines 
or enriches Britain’s cultural life?”, respectively. While the sources of immigration concern 
may vary, it seems that the respondents largely see the effects as being the same or highly 
similar, as these two variables are highly correlated (r = 0.80).  
 
Measures of personality are based on responses to the Ten-Item Personality Inventory (TIPI) 
(Gosling et al., 2003). Shown in the appendix, correlations indicate the traits are not highly 
correlated with each other. The highest correlation is between conscientiousness and 
neuroticism at r = -0.34. The correlation between the two most politically relevant traits, 
openness and conscientiousness is low (r = 0.08). None of these correlations are therefore 
perceived to be problematic for the analysis. The correlations between personality traits and 
immigrant group percentages are very low, but not zero. The largest is between openness and 
Western European immigrants (r = 0.05). It is likely that personality influences where people 
choose to live, and due to its relationships with income and employment status, it will indirectly 
influence what options are available. I believe these correlations are sufficiently low, however, 
to avoid serious theoretical problems for the analysis below. That these correlations do exist, 






Demographic controls are used in the analysis: sex, age, a measure of education, and personal 
income. Possible mediators are also used in the analysis. This includes self-reported left-right 
placement is used, as well as dummy variables for the major political parties. Local area-level 
covariates were also used, specifically 2011 population size and the 2014 unemployment level. 
The analysis was conducted using OLS multilevel regressions, with random intercepts varying 
by local area. To compare effect sizes, all independent variables have been min-max 
transformed so that 0 represents the lowest value and 1 the highest. In order to make the results 




The major results are summarized in Table 3. Model 1 excludes political covariates, while 
Model 2 includes them. In terms of demographic control variables, some findings should be 
noted. As has been found previously, age is found to predict hostility towards immigration, 
while both higher levels of education and income were found to predict less hostile immigration 
attitudes, with education having a stronger effect. These effects persist after the inclusion of 
political covariates. Additionally, men were predicted to be slightly less hostile to 
immigration.  
 
Local area level variables are also noteworthy, if predictable. A greater population predicts less 
hostile attitudes, while higher unemployment levels predict more hostile attitudes, though only 
once political attitudes are controlled for.  
 
All personality traits, aside from extraversion, were found to predict immigration attitudes, and 






conscientiousness. We find here that agreeableness predicts support for immigration, while 
neuroticism hostility, as expected. However, the effect of agreeableness becomes insignificant 
when political variables are included in the models. Aside from neuroticism, the effect sizes of 
all personality variables shrink in the presence of these party and political covariates. This 
indicates part of their effects may be mediated by ideology and party preference. That 
neuroticism does not have this effect indicates that its relationships with immigration attitudes 









































Table 3: Linear mixed models 
 
Model 1 Model 2  
 
Openness    -0.990*** -0.590***  
Conscientiousness   0.987*** 0.661***  
Extraversion    0.100  -0.017   
Agreeableness    -0.387*** -0.046   
Neuroticism    0.313*** 0.417***  
 
Male     -0.044  -0.095***  
Age     0.336*** 0.152**  
Education    -1.418*** -1.100***  
Income    -0.153** -0.317***  
 
Left-Right      2.259***    
Conservative      0.007    
Labour       -0.185***   
Libdem      -0.623***   
UKIP       1.048***    
Green       -0.503***   
 
Population    -0.553*** -0.375***  
Unemployment   -0.078  0.239**  
 
Western European Percent  -1.857*** -1.513*** 
Eastern European Percent  -0.090  -0.123 
Muslim Immigrant Percent  0.672*** 0.462*** 
 
Observations    15,431  15,431  
Groups (Local Areas)   374  374 
Log Likelihood   -30,028.370 -28,613.740  
Akaike Inf. Crit.   60,090.750 57,273.490  
 
SD of Random Effects: 
Local Area (intercept)   0.221  0.161 
Residual    1.682  1.536 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All continuous IVs standardized to be on 0 - 1, min-max 
scale. Higher values in the dependent variable indicate greater hostility. In order to better 
compare the results between the models, participants were dropped from Model 1 if they did 
not respond to the political questions. 
 
The general finding which emerges from the immigration measures is that Western European 
immigrant presence predicts less hostility towards immigration, Muslim-country immigrant 






significant relationship. Figure 1 shows predicted levels of hostility depending on percent of 
each immigrant group.  
 
Figure 1: Predicted immigration attitude levels by group population share 
 
Notes: Predicted values estimated from multilevel linear model, with bootstrap confidence 
intervals. Specifically, Model 2, presented above in Table 3. Immigration attitude scale runs 
from 1 to 7. Values above 4 represent hostility, while values below 4 represent support.  
 
This finding supports the expectation that white British citizens react differently to different 
groups of immigrants, with more culturally distant groups provoking more hostile responses. 
This is important nuance. When predicting the effects of neighborhood diversity on 
immigration attitudes, simply looking at the total number of immigrants is likely to be 
misleading. It is essential to disentangle the groups and measure them separately, in order to 







In order to establish whether personality traits moderate the effect of immigrant presence, or 
similarly, that immigrant presence moderates the effects of personality traits, I added 
interaction effects to the models presented in Table 3. I re-ran both of the models with an 
individual interaction between one of the personality traits and one of the immigrant group 
variables. Thus, for each personality trait, six separate models were constructed, each with one 
interaction. The purpose of this was to look for consistent patterns, both in terms of significance, 
as well as direction of effect. There could be a difference in how individuals respond to the 
different immigrant groups, however, to trust any differences found in immigrant group 
interactions, they should form a sensible pattern.  
 
Table 4:  Interactions 
 
Open.  Consc.  Extra.  Agree.  Neuro. 
 
Without Political Covariates - (N = 18301) 
Western  Europe % -1.41*  0.91  -0.80  0.67  0.07 
Eastern Europe % -0.98*  -0.33  -1.11*** 0.40  -0.39 
Muslim %  -0.87  -0.13  -0.99** 0.36  0.13 
 
With Political Covariates - (N = 15431) 
Western Europe % -0.40  0.76  -1.33** 0.45  0.03 
Eastern Europe % -1.05** -0.19  -1.15*** 0.20  -0.37 
Muslim %  -0.75  -0.05  -1.18*** 0.47  0.12 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All continuous IVs standardized to be on 0 - 1, min-max 
scale. All are multilevel linear models, including other covariates as seen in Table 3.  Unlike 
in Table 3, to maximize power, participants were not dropped from the first set of models.   
 
Table 4 shows the results of these interactions. First it is important to note what we do not find. 
For conscientiousness, agreeableness and neuroticism, even at a generous p < 0.1 standard, 
there are no significant results. The two traits which do show evidence of interaction effects 
are openness and extraversion. Openness and extraversion were highlighted as strong 






political attitudes more generally, as well as to friendship networks and to inter-ethnic 
friendships. No specific prediction was made for a main effect of extraversion, and indeed was 
not found to have such an effect. However, given its role in friendship networks, it was 
reasonable to expect that extraversion might be implicated in a contact effect, especially at 
higher immigration levels. The lack of a main effect would therefore be likely due to the fact 
that average immigration levels are quite low.6  
 
Figure 2 shows us predicted levels of immigration attitudes at 1% and 10% immigrant shares 
for the three groups, by levels of openness, both with and without political covariates. For all 
three immigrant groups, we see that at higher immigrant concentrations, the slope increases, 
showing that there is a larger differentiation between those low and high in openness. This 
effect is quite similar for interactions with all immigrant groups. This indicates there is no 
major difference in the effect pattern, based on immigrant group. What differs between the 
groups is the overall level of support. For all levels of openness, higher levels of Western 
European immigrants are associated with more supportive attitudes overall. However, the high-
open individuals show a greater increase in supportive attitudes than the low-open individuals. 
As we move to Eastern European and Muslim-country immigrants, we see the 10% line is 
shifted upwards. In the Eastern European condition, low-open individuals become more hostile 
to immigration at the 10% level, while high-open individuals become more supportive. In the 
Muslim origin condition, we see all groups are more hostile to immigration at the 10% level, 
 
6 In the appendix I replicate this analysis with a more conservative modeling strategy, with each 
model having five interactions – one for each personality trait and one of the immigrant group 
percentages. Following that strategy, the openness interactions generally stay consistent in 
terms of sign, however, they all lose their statistical significance. The extraversion interactions, 
while weakened in terms of significance, still support the findings above, with over half of the 






however low-open individuals have a large increase in hostility, while high-open individuals 
show little increase. 
 
Finally, we see that including political covariates changes the story subtly for interactions with 
Western European immigrant shares. Here we see that without political covariates, the 
interaction is most dramatic with this immigrant group, however that changes with the 
inclusion of political variables. This indicates that the interaction is partly driven by mediation 



















Figure 2: Predicted immigration attitudes based on openness and immigrant interactions 
 
Notes: X-axis represents increase from lowest value of openness to highest. Solid lines 
represent 1% share of population by immigrant group in question, dashed lines 10%. Shaded 
regions represent 95% confidence intervals. Predictions made from multilevel linear models, 
including all other covariates. Immigration attitude scale runs from 1 to 7. Values above 4 
represent hostility, while values below 4 represent support.  
 
 
Moving on to extraversion in Figure 3, we see a different, and even stronger pattern. At low 
immigrant levels, extraversion is weakly correlated with immigration hostility. However, that 






Figure 3: Predicted immigration hostility based on extraversion and immigrant interactions 
 
Notes: X-axis represents increase from lowest value of extraversion to highest. Solid lines 
represent 1% share of population by immigrant group in question, dashed lines 10%. Shaded 
regions represent 95% confidence intervals. Predictions made from multilevel linear models, 
including all other covariates. Immigration attitude scale runs from 1 to 7. Values above 4 
represent hostility, while values below 4 represent support.  
 
At higher immigrant concentrations we see that high levels of extraversion predict lower 
hostility levels. This is the case for all immigrant groups, both with and without political 






and general political attitudes. Once again we see the same pattern present in Figure 2 that, due 
to the disparate effects of each immigrant group, the line in the 10% condition shifts upwards 
as the group becomes more culturally distant. With a high percentage of Western European 
immigrants, we see that both high and low levels of extraversion predict greater levels of 
support for immigration, but this effect is magnified for more extraverted individuals. With 
high levels of Eastern European immigrants, we see that introverted individuals become 
slightly more hostile towards immigration, while extraverted individuals become slightly more 
supportive. And with high levels of immigrants from Muslim countries, we find that introverted 
individuals are more hostile, but no real change among extraverted individuals.  
 
These findings with extraversion, like with openness, may point to an unmeasured contact 
effect. Despite not having strong connections either to general political attitudes, or to 
immigration attitudes generally, we see here that at higher immigrant concentrations, 
extraversion becomes very relevant. This could indicate that extraverted individuals in these 
situations are more likely to have contact with immigrants, and this, according to contact theory, 
leads to more supportive attitudes towards immigration. This also points to a context 
dependency for this trait. Its major effect does not merely change in the presence of higher 
immigration levels, it may only really emerge under those conditions. 
 
2.6 Discussion 
Rising immigration levels could provoke two different responses. Either individuals could 
become more positive towards immigration, or more negative. And indeed, both phenomena 
were found here, for different groups of immigrants. High levels of Western European 






neutral effect, while Muslim presence was associated with slight hostility. This highlights the 
importance of avoiding broad conclusions about the effects of increasing diversity.  
 
This study also confirmed the important role of personality traits in predicting immigration 
attitudes, even when controlling for explicit measures of political preference and affiliation. 
Finally, this research showed that personality, specifically openness and extraversion, 
moderated the effect of immigrant presence on immigration attitudes. This demonstrates that 
whether someone responds positively or negatively to local immigration will depend both on 
who they are and the immigrant group in question.  
 
However, these interactions should be interpreted with caution. They followed a consistent 
pattern, but some specific coefficients were statistically insignificant. Some of the effect of 
openness, moreover, seems mediated by other political attitudes and affiliations. As a result, it 
is unclear exactly what is driving the interaction effects for openness. The strong relationship 
between extraversion and immigration attitudes only emerges at higher immigrant levels, 
however mean immigrant levels in the study were low, meaning this association is based on 
limited data points. Both traits were identified as being contenders for predicting increased 
contact with immigrants, providing a clear explanation for these interactions, but contact was 
not measured, which is the main limitation of this study. The interactions for extraversion seem 
to clearly point in the direction of a contact-driven relationship, however for openness, the 
interaction may also be due to other factors, such as threat sensitivity. Future research, therefore, 
which more carefully measures contact can greatly help us to understand how much of these 







The broad personality findings here are in accordance with existing research about the 
connections between the various traits and attitudes towards immigration and prejudice (e.g., 
Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 2018; Akrami et al., 2011; Dinesen et al., 2016; Gallego 
and Pardos-Prado, 2014; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). However, in previous immigration-
personality studies, openness and conscientiousness were not consistently highlighted as the 
most important traits, whereas here they were. This is more in line with the general findings 
about personality and political ideology, which has found those two traits to be of the greatest 
importance (Gerber et al., 2011b; Mondak et al., 2010; Jost et al., 2009). Despite the differences 
with other studies, it should be noted that, in this sample, the effect sizes for those two traits 
are nearly as large as for education, which has been considered a major predictor of 
immigration attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). This further indicates the importance 
of personality to immigration attitudes. These differences in which traits are found to be 
predictors may have to do with study methodology as well as local context. Both 
conscientiousness and neuroticism, for instance, were found to predict prejudice only in certain 
regions (Sibley and Duckitt, 2008). Personality may relate to immigration attitudes in a number 
of ways, and although the findings may at times diverge, the strength of these relationships 
indicates they deserve attention. Future studies can help us to understand better when certain 
traits are more relevant to immigration attitudes, and why these differences exist between 
different contexts. 
 
Previous studies have found interactions between personality traits and immigration levels or 
outgroup contact (Ackermann and Ackermann, 2015; Ackermann, Ackermann and Freitag 
2018; Danckert et al., 2017; Turner et al., 2014), however they do not precisely match what 
was found here, although they do not conflict with the findings here. Again, the differences 






(2018) and Ackermann and Ackermann (2015) found that the effect of conscientiousness 
disappeared in areas with higher diversity. That finding indicates that increasing levels of 
immigration can reduce the differences in effect between the two ends of a trait, a finding not 
found with other traits or in other studies. More research should be done to understand when 
that phenomenon is likely to occur, and moreover, if it is occurring through the more hostile 
end becoming more tolerant, or the more tolerant end becoming more hostile. This study found 
the presence of different immigrant groups are associated with differing attitudes towards 
immigration. However, it is notable that the interaction patterns were quite similar regardless 
of group. This indicates that the increased perceived threat associated with the different groups 
did not significantly alter the general moderation effect. That may have to do with the lack of 
sensitivity of the measures, or it could indicate that this effect is similar for all outgroups, just 
with differing starting points. 
 
Additionally, as with contact studies generally, longitudinal data would be very useful for 
understanding how opinions change over time. With this study, we do not know how long the 
respondents have been living in their listed local areas, or where they moved from. We do not 
know how much these findings relate to self-sorting and not contact directly. This may be 
especially true for the findings relating to Western European immigrants, where it is unlikely 
there were strong prejudices to begin with.  
 
What effect do increasing levels of immigration have on political attitudes? It is a simple 
question, but the answer may not be so straightforward. There is no single effect. This study 
finds strong evidence that immigration origin greatly influences how likely it is to provoke 
positive or negative responses in the British population. That likelihood will also depend on 






only is it a strong predictor of immigration attitudes, but as local immigration levels increase, 
the effects of certain traits may become even more prominent. In other words, at higher 






















2.7 Appendix  
Table A1: Summary statistics for immigrant population change variables 
 
Variables    Mean  SD  Min  Max 
 
Western European Change  0.26  0.45  -0.44  3.40  
Eastern European Change  1.39  1.18  -1.30  10.34 
Muslim Change   0.37  0.70  -3.40  4.07  
 
Notes: Change represents percentage point change from 2001 to 2011. Observations omitted 


























Table A2: Correlation matrix of personality and immigrant group percentages 
 
Variables    (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
(1) Openness   1.00 
(2) Conscientiousness  0.08 1.00 
(3) Extraversion  0.30 0.02 1.00 
(4) Agreeableness  0.09 0.24 0.05 1.00 
(5) Neuroticism  -0.11 -0.34 -0.13 -0.26 1.00 
(6) W. European Percent 0.05 -0.03 0.02 -0.04 0.01 1.00 
(7) E. European Percent 0.02 -0.03 0.01 -0.03 0.02 0.53 1.00 
(8) Muslim Percent  0.02 -0.02 0.02 -0.04 0.02 0.44 0.49    1.00 
 
Notes: The correlation reported here between Western European and Muslim immigrant groups 
is slightly different from that reported in Table 1 (r = 0.45). This is due to slight variations in 








































Table A3:  Linear mixed models for change variables  
 
Model 1 Model 2  
 
Openness   -0.988*** -0.588*** 
Conscientiousness  0.988*** 0.663*** 
Extraversion   0.100  -0.017 
Agreeableness   -0.388*** -0.047 
Neuroticism   0.317*** 0.419*** 
 
Male    -0.043  -0.094*** 
Age    0.331*** 0.149** 
Education   -1.418*** -1.101*** 
Income   -0.159*** -0.323*** 
 
Left-Right     2.259*** 
Conservative     0.003 
Labour      -0.187*** 
Libdem     -0.627*** 
UKIP      1.045*** 
Green      -0.505*** 
 
Population   -0.507*** -0.354** 
Unemployment  0.140  0.405*** 
 
W. European Change  -1.173*** -0.939*** 
E. European Change  -0.032  -0.157 
Muslim Immigrant Change 0.505** 0.392** 
 
Observations   15,431  15,431 
Groups (Local Areas)  374  374 
Log Likelihood  -30,030.100 -28,617.290 
Akaike Inf. Crit.  60,094.200 57,280.580 
 
SD of Random Effects: 
Local Area (intercept)  0.224  0.165 
Residual   1.682  1.536 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All continuous IVs standardized to be on 0 - 1, min-max 
scale. Higher values in the dependent variable indicate greater hostility. In order to better 
compare the results between the models, participants were dropped from Model 1 if they did 











Table A4:  Interactions for change variables 
 
Open.  Consc.  Extra.  Agree.  Neuro. 
 
Without Political Covariates – (N = 18301) 
W. Europe Change -1.51** 0.88  -0.84*  0.60  0.15 
E. Europe Change -0.89  -0.70  -1.38** 0.43  -0.59 
Muslim Change 0.12  -0.07  -0.35  0.59  -0.21 
 
With Political Covariates – (N = 15431) 
W. Europe Change -0.70  0.74  -1.23*** 0.19  0.33 
E. Europe Change -1.26*  -0.39  -1.40** 0.19  -0.57 
Muslim Change -0.34  -0.16  -0.44  0.24  -0.24 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All continuous IVs standardized to be on 0 - 1, min-max 
scale. All are multilevel linear models, including other covariates as seen in Table A3. Unlike 


























Table A5:  Interactions for percent variables – alternative modeling 
 
Open.  Consc.  Extra.  Agree.  Neuro. 
 
Without Political Covariates - (N = 18301) 
Western  Europe % -1.37  1.03  -0.53  0.69  0.42 
Eastern Europe % -0.66  -0.65  -1.05** 0.46  -0.71 
Muslim %  -0.52  -0.18  -0.87*  0.54  0.03 
 
With Political Covariates - (N = 15431) 
Western Europe % 0.03  0.78  -1.38** 0.45  0.24 
Eastern Europe % -0.73  -0.43  -1.07*** 0.23  -0.66 
Muslim %  -0.31  -0.17  -1.13** 0.65  0.02 
 
Notes: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. All continuous IVs standardized to be on 0 - 1, min-max 
scale. All are multilevel linear models, including other covariates as seen in Table 3.  Unlike 
in Table 3, to maximize power, participants were not dropped from the first set of models. 
Unlike in Table 4, each model included five interactions: the immigrant group percentage 


















3. Authoritarianism and anti-immigrant attitudes in the UK 
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The ‘cultural backlash’ to globalization has culminated in populist movements centered on 
opposition to immigration. In Britain, immigration attitudes were a key determinant of the 
Brexit referendum. While Brexit is often linked to the economic impact of globalization, 
research suggests cultural aspects of immigration are especially important in shaping anti-
immigrant attitudes. In this paper, we examine the effect of ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ 
(RWA) on immigration attitudes in the UK after Brexit. We use an original survey measuring 
attitudes towards immigration from differing skill-levels and national origins. In line with 
recent literature, we find RWA is a strong predictor of immigration attitudes. Additionally, the 
effect of RWA is strongest for attitudes towards culturally distant immigrant groups. Finally, 
these effects are driven most by the 'aggression' component of RWA, suggesting it is 
individuals who want strong leadership to enforce group norms who are most negative towards 


















A wave of political upheaval surrounding responses to globalization has struck many Western 
political systems in recent years. Populist leaders and parties have risen in prominence, with 
opposition to immigration central to these movements (Shehaj et al., 2019). The Leave vote in 
the Brexit referendum in the UK has similarly been shown to have been fueled in large part by 
concerns about immigration (Clery et al., 2017; Langella and Manning, 2016; Meleady et al., 
2017). With such far-reaching political implications, it is important to understand the nature 
and origins of immigration attitudes. 
 
Some research argues that economic conditions, such as the unemployment or austerity 
growing out of the 2008 financial crisis, are key factors predicting anti-immigrant attitudes 
(e.g., Rodrik, 2018). However, experimental work has shown that cultural threats are stronger 
than economic concerns in provoking opposition to immigration (Sniderman et al., 2004). 
Many scholars have thus focused on identifying the individual attributes that affect sensitivity 
to intergroup threats, showing that such sensitivity is influenced by measures such as 
‘authoritarianism’ and ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO) (Duckitt, 2006; Duckitt and 
Sibley, 2007). In particular, these traits are shown to influence which types of group prejudices 
are observed (Asbrock et al., 2010; Duckitt, 2006), as well as the types of outgroup threats that 
are most salient (Asbrock et al., 2012).  
 
Here, we build on this line of inquiry, drawing on research on authoritarian values and theories 
of intergroup threat to examine in more detail how these factors are associated with attitudes 
toward immigration. These literatures, taken together, suggest that a perceived need to protect 
the ingroup from potential cultural threats can serve as a key mechanism by which authoritarian 






tendency for individuals who are high in ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ (RWA)—who give 
preference to group norms, cohesion, and stability over individual needs and desires (Duckitt, 
1989)—to be more likely to hold hostile views towards immigration. We suggest that RWA 
has a uniquely strong role in predicting immigration attitudes because it captures a 
predisposition toward protecting the ingroup from perceived cultural threats (Duckett, 1989; 
Feldman, 2003; Feldman and Stenner, 1997), and because of the centrality of cultural threats 
in shaping attitudes towards immigration (McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Sides and Citrin, 2007).  
Further, if immigration is perceived as a cultural threat that prompts authoritarian 
predispositions to protect ingroup norms, we argue the RWA 'aggression' component is 
especially important. Aggression captures the predilection some individuals have for leaders 
and policies that take a tough stance towards deviants and outgroups (Altemeyer, 1996). 
Therefore, this component is especially relevant to the desire to protect the ingroup from 
outside threats, which may include immigration from culturally distant origins.  
 
To examine this, we focus on the extent to which individuals differentiate between types of 
immigration, arguing that this provides additional insight into the role that ingroup protection 
plays in the relationship between RWA and immigration attitudes. We use an original survey 
of British adults which examines the relative hostility towards immigrants of differing regional 
and skill-level backgrounds. This measure of immigration attitudes allows us to better 
understand the nature of authoritarianism's effects by allowing us to more precisely measure 
variation in responses to immigration from different regional backgrounds separate from those 








We make several empirical contributions. First, we illustrate that the differentiation made 
between low-versus-high-skilled immigrants is fundamentally different from the 
differentiation made across geographic origins. While respondents are broadly hostile towards 
low-skill immigration (Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010), we show that it is individuals who 
differentiate the most between immigrants by origin (as opposed to skill level) that tend to be 
most strongly against immigration in general, as well as for Brexit. 
 
Second, we show that RWA has a very strong effect compared to other individual-level 
predictors of immigration attitudes, such as education, age, income, left-right self-placement, 
and party affiliation. In particular, we find that RWA is a much stronger predictor of 
immigration attitudes than SDO or an explicit measure of prejudice. Most importantly, we 
show that, among these measures, RWA is the strongest predictor of the degree of importance 
people place on immigrants’ regional origins. This effect is most apparent for high-skilled 
immigrants.  
 
Finally, we examine the components of RWA and find that the aggression component, which 
focuses on the individual's emphasis on enforcement of ingroup norm preservation, 
demonstrates the strongest effect on immigration attitudes overall and differentiates most 
strongly by origin. This facet, we suggest, taps most into the desire for restrictive government 
policies with regard to immigration.  
 
We conclude with a discussion of the implications of these findings for our understanding of 







3.2 Authoritarianism and Immigration Attitudes 
 
 
An extensive literature has examined the motivation behind immigration attitudes and the 
threats that motivate hostility to immigration in particular. Studies focused on economic threats 
have examined income levels, sector of occupation, and sector presence in geographic areas, 
as determinants of hostility (e.g., Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010; 
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2015; Hanson et al., 2001; Sniderman et al., 2004). However, this 
work finds limited evidence for economic vulnerability as a driving cause, instead suggesting 
that the cultural effects of immigration are most salient in attitude formation (Hainmueller and 
Hopkins, 2014).  
 
Another strain of research on variation in immigration attitudes has focused on core traits, 
values, personality, and ideology. Such individual-level factors may relate to one's sensitivity 
to different forms of threat (e.g., Croucher, 2013; Stephan et al., 1998; Stephan et al., 1999). 
Sensitivity to cultural threat is of particular interest, as it may be a major source of overall 
immigration attitudes (Schoon and Anderson, 2017). Individual traits are likely sensitive to 
particular threats. As authoritarianism has been found to be a strong predictor of immigration 
attitudes (Cohrs and Stelzl, 2010; Golec de Zavala et al., 2017), an important question remains 
as to whether these observed associations are driven by sensitivity to cultural threat, with 
authoritarian values directing particular negativity towards groups perceived as threatening to 
the social order. 
 
Measurement of authoritarianism originates with the work by Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, 
Levinson, and Sanford (1950). This was further developed and refined, most notably, by 






Although there is some disagreement about how authoritarianism should be measured, there 
seems to be some agreement about the general characteristics of this trait. Authoritarianism can 
be seen as the inclination to give preference to group norms, cohesion, and stability over 
individual needs and desires (Duckitt, 1989; Feldman, 2003). As RWA includes a 
predisposition for upholding norms, and immigration can be seen as a threat to the national 
culture (Newman et al., 2012), it is therefore not surprising that RWA and hostility towards 
immigration are associated.  
 
While RWA has been found to predict intolerance and prejudicial views toward outgroups (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1998; Ekehammer et al., 2014; Sibley and Duckitt, 2008), explicit attitudes of 
outgroup inferiority are distinct from RWA’s emphasis on protecting the ingroup from cultural 
threats, which may also come from socially deviant members of the ingroup. However, in the 
context of attitudes toward ingroup protection, the cultural effects of immigration are likely 
most important to this trait and therefore RWA should be most associated with hostility towards 
culturally distant groups.  
 
Several scholars have suggested that RWA consists of three core components, or facets: 
‘aggression’, ‘submission’, and ‘conventionalism’ (or ‘traditionalism’). The aggression 
dimension taps into aggressive and punitive attitudes towards rule-breakers, deviants, and 
outgroups, for example, focusing on whether the individual believes that society needs tougher 
government and stricter laws. Conventionalism instead taps into traditional values and gauges 
beliefs about whether people should adhere to societal norms, for example, focusing on sex, 
marriage, and drugs. The submission dimension focuses on beliefs about whether individuals 
should submit to legitimate authorities, and whether it is important that children learn to obey 






to have distinct qualities pertinent to the issue of sensitivity to cultural threats (Duckitt et al., 
2010) 
 
Considering the important role of cultural threats in determining immigration attitudes, and 
that individuals should be more hostile towards immigration when they have a desire to protect 
their ingroup, the aggression facet of RWA is especially important for immigration attitudes. 
As mentioned, aggression focuses on the idea that some individuals will prefer that the 
government takes a tougher stance towards deviants and outgroups to protect their own ingroup. 
If immigrants in general, or those from a specific origin, are perceived as a cultural outgroup 
that threatens the ingroup, individuals high in aggression will want to reduce their numbers 
entering the country. Hence, these individuals should prefer more restricted immigration, 
particularly from more culturally distant origins.  
 
Another trait suggested as a predictor of immigration attitudes is ‘social dominance orientation’ 
(SDO), designed to capture acceptance of hierarchy and the legitimacy of the dominant group 
(Henry et al., 2005). It has been used in recent research on the rise of populism, such as Mutz 
(2018), as a measure of status threat, to explain for Donald Trump's support in the US. Like 
RWA, SDO also influences prejudicial views (e.g., Danso et al., 2007; Sibley and Duckitt, 
2008; Thomsen et al., 2008). 
 
However, previous work shows that the two measures differ in their relation to prejudice and 
immigration hostility. Duckitt and Sibley (2010) show, for example, that RWA's relationship 
with immigration attitudes is particularly sensitive to differences in cultural values, as well as 
perceived threats, such as from crime or terrorism. In contrast, these authors find that SDO was 






emphasizes group equality is at the core of the evaluation. Thomson et al. (2008) show that 
RWA predicts hostility towards immigrants who do not assimilate into the majority culture, 
while SDO predicts hostility towards immigrants who do assimilate, as this blurs group 
boundaries.  
 
In the next section, we describe the survey we use to examine the impacts of individual factors 
and sensitivities to different types of immigration. In particular, we examine whether RWA 
responds to the cultural aspects of immigration concerns, due to the association between this 
trait and cultural threats.  
 
3.3 Research Design 
 
A large-scale survey measuring anti-immigrant attitudes  
 
To better understand the relationship between immigration attitudes and individual traits, we 
surveyed a sample of British respondents recruited through Prolific Academic, using the 
Qualtrics survey platform. In return for completing our survey, participants received a payment 
of £3.5. In total, we surveyed 1102 individuals. We sought to balance both party affiliation and 
support for the Brexit referendum. 29% of our sample affiliated with the Conservative party, 
33% with Labour, 20% did not declare any affiliation, and the remaining respondents were 
distributed among other parties. Of those in our sample who voted in the EU referendum, 
approximately 50% voted Remain and 50% Leave. The sample is 55% female and 45% male, 
with 46% having university education or higher. 
 
To measure economic and cultural immigration concerns, we asked our respondents to indicate 






geographic origins. By probing our respondents on a range of types of immigrants, we can 
better isolate the importance of economic or cultural factors in preferences for changes to 
immigration. We created a grid of choices based on skill level and type of immigration. Our 
analysis below is based on the responses to the high-skilled and low-skilled grids. Existing 
research has assessed and contrasted attitudes towards immigrants based on these skill levels, 
as they may differ due to, for instance, potential labor competition, concerns such as burdening 
the public services, or beliefs about the economic benefits of immigrants with needed expertise 
(e.g., Facchini and Mayda, 2009; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2010). 
 
Within each skill-level grid, the participants stated whether they preferred more, less, or the 
current number of immigrants from several potential geographic origins across which 
individuals are likely to have different attitudes. The survey captures a range of possible 
perceptions via categories for ‘Western European’, ‘Muslim,’ ‘Commonwealth’, ‘Eastern 
European’, ‘East Asian’, and ‘Sub-Saharan African’ countries. Previous research suggests that 
Western Europe is likely to be seen as among the least culturally distant origins for immigration 
(Dustmann and Preston, 2007), while perceived cultural distance is likely greater for 
immigrants from Muslim countries (Richardson, 2004). In a recent analysis, Ford (2011) shows 
that attitudes toward immigrants in the UK are consistently more favorable when countries of 
origin are associated with white immigrants and have “stronger economic, cultural and political 
links to Britain” (pp. 1033). Our categories overlap in this regard — with The Commonwealth, 
for instance, encompassing other categories — but overall grant us variation in perceptions of 







For our analysis, we use the responses directly as well as compute a mean score of all the skill 
and geographic origins to assess overall attitudes towards desired immigration levels (mean = 
2.15, sd = 0.43, alpha = 0.96).  
 
Measuring predictors of immigration attitudes 
 
 
To measure RWA, we used a slightly modified version of a 12-item RWA scale (Funke, 2005). 
We took the mean of all responses and then computed a min-max transformation (which we 
computed for all non-dummy independent variables) (mean = 0.46, sd = 0.17, alpha = 0.84). 
We also measure the three specific components of RWA to get a fuller understanding of how 
RWA is related to immigration attitudes. We computed scales using the items for RWA's three 
components, as shown in Funke (2005). We find somewhat low Cronbach's alphas among these 
components, especially for conventionalism and submission: aggression (alpha = 0.75), 
conventionalism (alpha = 0.65), and submission (alpha = 0.62). 
 
To distinguish the effects of RWA from SDO, we measure this using the 8-item SDO-D scale. 
Here we also take the mean of responses (mean = 0.37, sd = 0.21, alpha = 0.88). Although 
these represent different theoretical constructs, we find that RWA and SDO are correlated here 
at r = 0.55. See the appendix for a full correlation matrix of our dispositional measures. 
 
As immigration attitudes have been linked to racial and ethnic prejudicial attitudes, we include 
a measure of explicit prejudice. This allows us to determine whether RWA and SDO may be 
mediated by prejudice or have effects independent of prejudicial beliefs. Furthermore, it is 






created a scale made up of three items used by the European Social Survey to capture explicit 
prejudicial beliefs. These items are: 
 
'Some races or ethnic groups are born less intelligent than others.' 
'Some races or ethnic groups are born harder working than others.' 
'Some cultures are much better than others.' 
 
We computed the mean to create the scale (mean = 0.33, sd = 0.25, alpha = 0.76).  
 
To fully understand if RWA and SDO are distinct from overall ideological profiles or policy 
preferences, it is necessary to distinguish their roles from that of left-right measures, which 
predict a wide variety of attitudes and behaviors. For this reason, we use the self-placement of 
respondents on a ‘left-right’ scale.  While RWA and SDO can correlate with this scale (see, 
e.g., Mirisola et al., 2007), the effects of authoritarian traits on immigration attitudes are more 
central and fundamental than those originating from a left-right division.  
 
We include four controls for respondent demographics: age, gender, income, and university-
level education (binary). These controls are commonly accounted for in literature on 
immigration attitudes, with older, male, lower-income, and less educated respondents' typically 
in opposition to immigration. Each of these also captures elements of respondents' potential 









3.4 Empirical Analyses 
 
Immigration attitudes: descriptive patterns 
 
In order to indirectly study cultural and economic concerns about immigration, we asked our 
respondents if they wanted more, fewer, or the same number of immigrants from various skill 
levels and origin regions. In Figure 1, we can see how many respondents our sample wanted to 
increase, decrease, or maintain the current number of high- and low-skilled immigrants from 
different regions. 
 
For the high-skill category, few respondents want to decrease immigration levels from any 
group, and relatively more who want to increase immigration. The pattern is reversed for low-
skilled immigrants, with a large amount wanting to decrease immigration levels, and very few 
wanting an increase. Here the effects are exaggerated. More people want to reduce low-skill 
immigration than increase high-skill immigration (and vice versa). In both skill-level categories, 
a large proportion prefers to maintain the current levels. 
 
There is also a clear pattern regarding immigrants of different origins, with some groups 
consistently favored relative to others. Western European and Commonwealth immigrants are 
most favored, while Muslim and African immigrants are least favored. However, this variation 











Figure 1: Attitudes towards immigrants of different skill levels and different origins 
 
 
The overall pattern is one of general hostility toward low-skill immigration, and cultural 
concerns are not the largest source of variation. However, our purpose is to determine if 
differentiation across origins (and the cultural concerns this represents) results from systematic 
differences in the traits we examine.   
 
To illustrate the difference between these two types of differentiation, we computed measures 
based on the variance on skill and origin in the mean responses to our question of increasing 
or decreasing immigration. To create the measure of skill differentiation, reflecting economic 
concerns, we took the difference between the high-skill and low-skill means across all origins. 
To compute the origin differentiation measure, we took the difference between the Western 
European and Muslim means across skill levels. For this purpose, we remove the few 
respondents who preferred low-skill or Muslim immigration, so that the scale begins with the 








Figure 2: Immigration opposition (left) and Brexit vote (right) by skill and origin 
differentiation  
  
Notes: Two single-variate OLS regressions (left) and logistic regressions (right). Shaded 
regions represent 95% confidence intervals. The dependent variable is overall immigration 
attitudes (left) and Leave vote (right). Skill IV represents the difference between the mean of 
high-skilled immigrant groups and the mean of low-skilled immigrant groups. Origin IV 
represents the difference between the mean of Western European immigrants and immigrants 
from Muslim countries. The immigration hostility scale was min-max transformed, running 
from 0 to 1.   
 
 
In Figure 2 (left), we show the overall measure of immigration attitudes regressed separately 
on skill differentiation and cultural differentiation. On the right side of Figure 2, we show the 
same relationship applied to the participants' vote for Leave in the Brexit referendum. Together, 
these figures show that an individual's tendency to discriminate on immigrants' cultural origins 
is a strong predictor of overall immigration attitudes and relevant policy preferences. The 
tendency to discriminate against immigrants of lower skill levels has much weaker predictive 
power. In our sample, those who make no distinction for either skill-level or origin are 
predicted to have voted Leave at a probability of 45%. Among those who make the largest skill 
distinction for immigrants, about 61% are predicted to have voted Leave. However, that 
number increases to 82% among those who make the largest distinction based on origin. This 
is especially notable considering the fact that leaving the European Union does not directly 






scale (0-1 min-max transformed scale), the difference between exhibiting minimum and 
maximum skill-level distinctions was predicted to increase from .56 to .62, compared to a 
difference of .55 to .79 between the minimum and maximum origin distinctions.  
  
Multivariate analyses predicting immigration attitudes 
 
 
To examine what factors are most important in determining immigration attitudes from 
different skill levels and origin regions, we ran individual ordinal logistic regressions for each 
of the skill-origin combinations. Figure 3 (left panel) displays the results for immigrants with 
low skill levels, while Figure 3 (right panel) displays the results for immigrants with high skill 
levels. 
 
Looking at both panels, we see that, of the demographic variables, the most important is age, 
which predicts hostility towards immigration. The other demographic variables are generally 
not statistically significant in these models where traits and ideology are included. Of all the 
variables, RWA has the strongest effect. Focusing specifically on the ideological and 
dispositional variables, we see important differences between the two conditions. The effect of 
prejudice is stronger in the high-skill condition while identifying as being conservative on the 
left-right spectrum is stronger in the low-skill condition. In both conditions, the range of effect 
sizes is larger for RWA, which indicates that the effect varies by origin categories. While a 
distinction present in both low and high skill cases, the difference is much larger within the 
high-skill category. Within that category, we see that RWA has the weakest effect for Western 
European and Commonwealth immigrants, while the effect is strongest for Eastern European, 
Sub-Saharan African and Muslim immigrants, with East Asian immigrants in between. This 






African, and Muslim immigrants much more than it does hostility towards those from Western 
European and Commonwealth countries.  
 
Figure 3: Ordered logit models for low-skill (left) and high-skill (right) immigrants 
  
Notes: Ordered logistic regressions. Regression coefficients are represented by the dots, while 
95 percent confidence intervals with the horizontal lines. Variables were transformed to be on 
a min-max scale, where moving from zero to one indicates movement from the lowest observed 
value to the observed highest value for the variable.   
 
It is noteworthy that these differences exist when controlling for an explicit measure of 
prejudice and that the differing effects of RWA are not based just on ethnic distinctions. The 
coefficient for Eastern European immigrants is comparable to that of sub-Saharan African and 
Muslim immigrants, especially in the high-skill condition.  Commonwealth also tends to be 
comparable to Western Europe, even though our prompt made it clear this label encompasses 
countries with predominantly non-European populations (our example countries were Australia 
and India). The results are consistent with our expectation that RWA's effect on immigration 
attitudes depends on perceived cultural proximity, as the cultural connections between the 







We also examined several alternate models (see the appendix for tables of all our models, 
including alternate ones). First, in the analysis above we have omitted party dummies from our 
models since party identification is likely endogenous to RWA and the other ideological and 
trait variables. If we include party dummies in the models above, we find statistically 
significant relationships (at the p < .05 level) only in the high-skill condition, and only for 
UKIP and Conservative supporters. Moreover, all the models without party dummies have 
better fit in the low-skill condition, according to the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). In 
the high-skill condition, most of the models have a better fit with party dummies included, 
however the differences are marginal. Overall, the effects of party identification cannot be 
easily distinguished from the values behind these affiliations, and so those results should be 
read with caution. Nevertheless, the separate effects of party affiliation are sufficiently small 
such that including party dummies in our models does not impact the strong effects found for 
RWA.   
 
As the ideological and trait variables (SDO, RWA, prejudice, and left-right) are partly 
interrelated, we also investigated whether these are more consequential in the absence of the 
others. Therefore, we examined models with the demographic variables as well as each 
ideological or trait variable, independent of the others. For every ideological and trait variable, 
in every model, the effect size increases and the coefficient becomes significant. Importantly, 
when RWA is not present, other variables exhibit the general origin-based effect size orderings 
seen above for RWA, with larger differences in the high-skill condition. However, run 
independently, RWA still demonstrates by far the strongest effect overall, as well as the 
greatest differentiation based on origin. These findings indicate that some of the effects that 
could be attributed to SDO, prejudice, and left-right self-placement are derived from shared 






measures that drive their effects. Additionally, when SDO is included alone, there are only 
modest and inconsistent differences between the two skill level conditions, not supporting the 
contention that SDO has a particularly strong impact on attitudes toward low-skilled 
immigration. 
 
So far, we have treated the response toward different immigrant types as continuous, ignoring 
the categorical distinctions between the choices. As there are three distinct choices with regard 
to each type of immigration – increase, decrease, stay the same – we can also distinguish the 
predicted effects for each level. Figure 4 reports predicted probabilities for the three different 
levels of the dependent variable for the four most distinct types of immigrant groups, as derived 
from the findings above: high-skilled immigrants from Western Europe, high-skilled 
immigrants from Muslim countries, low-skilled immigrants from Western Europe, and low-
skilled immigrants from Muslim countries.  
 
Looking at the two low-skill populations, we see that the Western Europe and Muslim country 
patterns are similar. Even among those with low RWA, few wish to increase the low-skilled 
immigration numbers and most wish to keep levels the same. However, as the level of RWA 
increases, that answer decreases in probability, while the desire to decrease the number of 
immigrants increases. The difference between "stay the same" and "decrease" is larger when 
the immigrant population comes from Muslim countries. At the highest level of RWA, the 
probability of wanting to decrease low-skill Muslim immigration is around 87%, while it is 
around 68% for Western European low-skilled immigrants. These two plots corroborate the 
earlier results. Even low-RWA individuals are significantly hostile to low-skilled immigration, 
and as a result, the room for differentiation between origin is smaller for high-RWA individuals. 






decrease the level of low-skilled immigrants, regardless of origin. Although respondents 
overall have a negative attitude toward low-skill immigration, RWA increases that opposition. 
This reflects the general opposition RWA predicts for immigration. 
 
Figure 4: Detailed predicted probabilities for desired levels of four immigrant groups 
 
Notes: Predicted probabilities of giving each desired immigration level. Computed from ordinal 
logistic regressions, with all other variables held at their means.  
 
While the two low-skilled plots are quite similar to each other in their patterns, the two high-
skill plots differ quite substantially, both from the low-skilled plots and each other. For high-
skilled Western European immigrants, even at very high levels of RWA, few wish to decrease 
the rate of immigration. Increasing levels of RWA lowers the probability of supporting an 
increase in immigration rates, while raising support for 'stay the same.' If the high-skilled 
immigrants come from Muslim countries, the pattern is very different. As RWA increases past 






'decrease' becomes the most likely viewpoint. At the highest level of RWA there is almost a 
64% probability that a respondent would wish to decrease high-skilled immigration if it 
originates from a Muslim country. In contrast, if that immigrant had come from Western 
Europe, the probability would have been approximately 17%. Thus, we see here that while high 
levels of RWA predict an overall hostility towards immigration, it is at high skill levels that 
one most sees the relevance of origin. 
 
Analyzing the impact of various dimensions of RWA 
 
 
As described above, Altemeyer (1996) conceptualized the RWA scale as being composed of 
three facets: ‘aggression’, ‘conventionalism’, and ‘submission’. The scale was designed to 
aggregate these specific aspects of authoritarianism, and the items were written to capture 
multiple facets, making the scale essentially unidimensional. Funke (2005) argues that, while 
the overall scale is the best measure of authoritarianism, understanding which aspects of the 
scale are most relevant requires decomposing the scale into these three components. Funke 
proposes a revised set of items, each intended to more clearly capture an individual facet of 
authoritarianism. 
 
Below, in Figure 5, we replicate the models in Figure 3 substituting in the individual 
components, instead of the full RWA scale. Note that in our main analysis of these components, 
we include each independently. Although the components are only moderately correlated 
(aggression and conventionalism: r = 0.49, aggression and submission: r = 0.61, 
conventionalism and submission: r = 0.66), we intend to capture both their individual 






simultaneously including all components in the appendix, along with a discussion of the 
differences between the two sets of findings. 
 
In the high-skill condition, we see that all three RWA components are associated with 
opposition to immigration from all groups. The submission component does not strongly 
differentiate between origins and does not present a preference order in line with the overall 
RWA scale ordering. Both conventionalism and aggression, however, do have these properties 
of the overall RWA index, with a stronger effect with aggression. For aggression, the 
differentiation is about the same as is present for the overall RWA scale. That aggression is a 
strong predictor of origin differentiation is consistent with an emphasis on cultural threats, 
given the association between this component and punitiveness towards rule-breakers and 
outgroups. The differentiation present for conventionalism indicates that traditional beliefs and 






Figure 5: Ordered logit models with RWA components 
 
Notes: Regression models include the same variables as those in Figure 3 with one of the RWA 
components included. Here, only the RWA component coefficients are displayed, with 95 
percent confidence intervals. Variables are standardized to be on a min-max scale, where 
moving from zero to one indicates movement from the lowest to the highest value.  
 
In the low-skill condition, we again see a similar order of coefficient magnitudes with both 
aggression and conventionalism. However, with conventionalism, only half of the coefficients 
are statistically significant. Aggression is by far the strongest predictor here, and while the 
origin differentiation is present, this is much weaker than in the high-skill condition, as is with 
the overall RWA index. Submission shows significant relationships for all origin groups, yet 
with no differentiation between the origins. Submission seems to represent in both conditions 
a general hostility towards immigration. 
 
That aggression has the most differentiation between origin groups suggests that the finding 
regarding RWA in the main analysis above is driven in large part by the aggression component, 






hostility towards low-skilled immigrants, only aggression has a similarly strong effect. In the 
high-skill condition, we do not find a similar pattern, suggesting aggression is not the only 
component driving overall attitudes towards immigration. Overall, these findings suggest that 
aggression captures a threat-sensitivity to both culturally distant immigrants and low-skill 




Understanding the sources of immigration attitudes has become especially important for 
understanding the changes taking place in many Western societies, including phenomena such 
as Brexit and the rise of populism.  In this study, based on an original survey of UK citizens, 
we found support for the central role of authoritarianism in this dynamic. In predicting attitudes 
towards immigration, a common operationalization of this trait, ‘right-wing authoritarianism’ 
(RWA), has a far stronger substantive effect on immigration attitudes than other predictors, 
such as prejudice and ‘social dominance orientation’ (SDO). 
 
By separately measuring immigration preferences by different origin and skill levels, we can 
better understand the effects of RWA on immigration attitudes. This gives us insight into the 
mechanism behind hostility: what aspects of immigration are causing a negative response from 
individuals high in authoritarianism. We found here not only that RWA strongly predicts 
differences in overall attitudes towards immigrants, but that the origins of immigrants 
differentiate these effects. Although research has shown that SDO's effect is likely triggered 
by low-skill immigration (Duckitt and Sibley, 2010), we do not find strong differentiation by 
skill-level. Even when RWA is not present in the model, there are small and inconsistent 






sample do not add support to the notion that SDO is capturing a unique feature of immigration 
attitudes. 
 
By examining the roles of different facets of RWA, our results help us understand how 
authoritarianism relates to immigration concerns. While all components drive overall hostility 
towards high-skill immigrants to a similar extent, the aggression component was most strongly 
predictive of overall hostility towards low-skill immigrants. We additionally find that 
aggression is the largest factor in discrimination between origins, although conventionalism 
clearly plays a large role as well. The findings for aggression, however, demonstrate the critical 
role for the "law-and-order" aspect of authoritarianism in determining both immigration 
attitudes overall and preferences for culturally similar immigrants. We interpret this as support 
for our argument that the connection between authoritarianism and immigration is driven 
primarily by traits associated with an emphasis on enforcement of ingroup norms.  
 
As the facets of right-wing authoritarianism seem to differ in their relationship to immigration 
hostility, future research should further refine the measurement scale and its various facets. 
Multiple ways of measuring authoritarianism will illuminate the contexts in which 
authoritarian traits most predict immigration hostility. 
 
These findings are important in light of the extant literature. In their seminal piece, Hainmueller 
and Hopkins (2015) found a "hidden American consensus" on immigration in the US, with 
very strong agreement on the type of immigrant favored by Americans and little variation due 
to education levels or party leanings. Although our results in the UK are consistent with this 






towards different immigrant groups — the strength of preferences varies substantially and 
systematically with authoritarianism levels measured by RWA.   
 
Authoritarian individuals, for whom protecting ingroup norms is crucial, are especially hostile 
towards those with culturally distant origins. We find, for example, that an individual at the 
lowest levels of RWA would have almost a 60% probability of choosing to increase numbers 
of high-skilled immigrants from Muslim countries, while those at the highest levels of RWA 
have virtually no probability of holding this preference. Even if we assumed that individuals 
with high and low authoritarian predispositions share preferences for the ideal immigrant, the 
preferred immigration levels from specific immigrant groups vary dramatically between these 
groups. This represents a sharp divide among individuals, which was also apparent in attitudes 
toward Brexit.  
 
More broadly, these findings are relevant to recent work emphasizing a shift in political 
dynamics in western countries from an economic left-right division to a division based more 
on divisions regarding authoritarianism (Dalton, 2018; Hetherington and Weiler, 2009; Scotto 
et al., 2018; Surridge, 2018). The connection to immigration as a cultural threat illuminates one 
pathway for how authoritarianism may contribute to the modern globalization divide facing 
many Western democracies.  As polarization among citizens can undermine social cohesion, it 













Figure A1: Ordered logit models with RWA components (together) 
 
Notes: Regression models include the same variables as those in Figure 3 with RWA 
components included instead of the overall RWA scale. Here, only the RWA component 
coefficients are displayed, with 95 percent confidence intervals. Variables are standardized to 
be on a min-max scale, where moving from zero to one indicates movement from the lowest to 
the highest value.  
 
When we include all three components in the same models, this eliminates the effects of the 
components’ shared variance. While, we see some differences, the key findings for aggression 
are still present. Regarding the other components, in the low-skill condition, all coefficients are 
not statistically significant except for one. Meanwhile, in the high-skill condition none of the 
correlations for submission, and only half of those with conventionalism, are statistically 
significant. The ordering pattern is still present for conventionalism, especially in the high-skill 
condition, indicating it provides a distinct contribution to the main RWA origin-differentiation 






closeness, we must be cautious in interpreting this alternative model. However, it is important 





























Table A1: RWA items 
    
Aggression 
 
• What our country really needs instead of more “civil rights” is a good stiff dose of law 
and order 
 
• What our country really needs is a strong, determined leader who will crush evil doers 
and set us on our right way again. 
 
• There is no crime that justifies capital punishment. 
 




• The withdrawal from tradition will turn out to be a fatal mistake one day. 
 
• Being virtuous and law-abiding is in the long run better for us than permanently 
challenging the foundations of our society. 
 
• People should develop their own personal standards about good and evil and pay less 
attention to the Bible and other old, traditional forms of religious guidance. 
 





• Obedience and respect for authority are the most important values children should learn. 
 
• The real keys to the “good life” are obedience, discipline, and virtue. 
 
• The days when women are submissive should belong strictly in the past. A “woman’s 
place” in society should be wherever she wants it to be. 
 
• It is good that nowadays young people have greater freedom “to make their own rules” 












Table A2: Sample demographics 
    
     n  (%) 
Gender                                                                                . 
Male     496  45 
Female    606  55 
Age                                                                                      . 
18-24     134  12 
25-34     311  28 
35-44     291  26 
45-54     210  19  
55-64     118  11 
65+     38  3 
Education                                                                            . 
Below University   591  54 








































Table A3: Correlation matrix of ideology and immigration attitudes 
     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)  
(1) RWA   1.00 
(2) SDO   0.55 1.00 
(3) Prejudice   0.48 0.52 1.00 
(4) Left-Right   0.53 0.51 0.33 1.00 
(5) Immigration Attitudes 0.51 0.39 0.31 0.37 1.00 
(6) Aggression   0.85 0.49 0.42 0.46 0.52 1.00 
(7) Conventionalism   0.82 0.43 0.39 0.42 0.34 0.49 1.00 













































Table A4: Ordered Logit - High Skill – Demographics 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.899*** 1.132*** 1.233*** 0.493** 1.173*** 1.111*** 
 (0.252) (0.245) (0.241) (0.248) (0.252) (0.244) 
Male -0.056 -0.072 0.126 -0.133 -0.005 0.042 
 (0.130) (0.126) (0.124) (0.129) (0.129) (0.127) 
Income -0.005 -0.024 0.038 0.411 0.272 0.352 
 (0.298) (0.288) (0.286) (0.296) (0.296) (0.291) 
University -0.294** -0.360*** -0.488*** -0.379*** -0.408*** -0.521*** 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.127) (0.131) (0.131) (0.129) 
AIC 1746.33 1963.98 2049.78 1807.37 1856.27 1975.44 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 



































Table A5: Ordered Logit - Low Skill – Demographics 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.960*** 0.766*** 0.843*** 0.622** 0.834*** 0.891*** 
 (0.245) (0.244) (0.247) (0.243) (0.242) (0.246) 
Male -0.064 -0.052 -0.031 -0.158 -0.054 -0.112 
 (0.127) (0.127) (0.128) (0.127) (0.126) (0.128) 
Income 0.239 0.308 0.476 -0.003 0.235 0.457 
 (0.290) (0.291) (0.294) (0.290) (0.288) (0.292) 
University -0.491*** -0.557*** -0.535*** -0.437*** -0.429*** -0.529*** 
 (0.130) (0.130) (0.131) (0.129) (0.129) (0.130) 
AIC 1849.43 1819.11 1765.18 1864.3 1852.64 1794.85 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 



































Table A6: Ordered Logit - High Skill – Main Model 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.789*** 0.917*** 0.994*** 0.399 1.032*** 0.883*** 
 (0.257) (0.251) (0.250) (0.254) (0.257) (0.253) 
Male 0.006 0.031 0.222* -0.076 0.067 0.136 
 (0.134) (0.131) (0.131) (0.133) (0.134) (0.133) 
Income -0.227 -0.352 -0.440 0.204 -0.017 -0.087 
 (0.304) (0.298) (0.298) (0.301) (0.304) (0.302) 
University -0.031 0.049 0.020 -0.136 -0.060 -0.045 
 (0.141) (0.137) (0.137) (0.139) (0.140) (0.139) 
RWA 2.142*** 3.787*** 3.806*** 2.077*** 2.787*** 3.659*** 
 (0.531) (0.525) (0.526) (0.523) (0.524) (0.526) 
SDO 0.555 0.211 1.002** 0.832** 1.115*** 0.886** 
 (0.416) (0.408) (0.409) (0.413) (0.417) (0.409) 
Prejudice 0.185 0.438 1.088*** 0.141 0.264 0.801*** 
 (0.313) (0.307) (0.309) (0.311) (0.313) (0.310) 
Left Right -0.146 0.135 0.370 -0.250 -0.053 0.528 
 (0.388) (0.380) (0.378) (0.383) (0.384) (0.381) 
AIC 1711.04 1852.52 1848.41 1767.75 1768.12 1802.34 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A7: Ordered Logit - Low Skill – Main Model 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.825*** 0.581** 0.616** 0.467* 0.662*** 0.647** 
 (0.253) (0.256) (0.265) (0.251) (0.253) (0.261) 
Male 0.023 0.059 0.071 -0.070 0.049 -0.036 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.138) (0.132) (0.133) (0.136) 
Income -0.090 -0.060 0.028 -0.309 -0.119 0.043 
 (0.298) (0.303) (0.313) (0.298) (0.299) (0.308) 
University -0.204 -0.221 -0.091 -0.156 -0.082 -0.101 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.145) (0.138) (0.139) (0.143) 
RWA 2.294*** 3.092*** 3.384*** 2.530*** 3.113*** 3.377*** 
 (0.524) (0.533) (0.548) (0.520) (0.524) (0.542) 
SDO 1.042** 1.032** 1.171*** 1.091*** 1.116*** 1.053** 
 (0.407) (0.415) (0.429) (0.409) (0.415) (0.421) 
Prejudice -0.269 -0.178 0.492 -0.282 -0.232 0.301 
 (0.308) (0.311) (0.324) (0.306) (0.311) (0.318) 
Left Right 0.857** 0.824** 1.168*** 0.705* 0.691* 1.080*** 
 (0.384) (0.387) (0.402) (0.383) (0.387) (0.396) 
AIC 1770.84 1705.6 1590.75 1779.61 1740.04 1638.64 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A8: Ordered Logit - High Skill - Party 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.852*** 0.942*** 1.045*** 0.457* 1.125*** 0.938*** 
 (0.261) (0.255) (0.255) (0.257) (0.262) (0.257) 
Male 0.009 0.023 0.224* -0.077 0.065 0.139 
 (0.134) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) (0.134) (0.134) 
Income -0.140 -0.266 -0.338 0.293 0.041 0.042 
 (0.307) (0.301) (0.302) (0.304) (0.307) (0.306) 
University -0.006 0.069 0.053 -0.090 -0.029 -0.018 
 (0.142) (0.138) (0.139) (0.140) (0.141) (0.141) 
RWA 2.126*** 3.774*** 3.887*** 2.000*** 2.768*** 3.764*** 
 (0.541) (0.536) (0.540) (0.534) (0.535) (0.541) 
SDO 0.612 0.238 1.043** 0.912** 1.244*** 0.956** 
 (0.420) (0.412) (0.416) (0.419) (0.422) (0.415) 
Prejudice 0.117 0.338 0.998*** 0.040 0.165 0.665** 
 (0.317) (0.311) (0.314) (0.315) (0.317) (0.315) 
Left Right 0.197 0.441 0.683 0.201 0.645 1.024** 
 (0.443) (0.439) (0.439) (0.441) (0.445) (0.444) 
Conservative -0.431** -0.185 -0.316 -0.381* -0.394** -0.413** 
 (0.198) (0.194) (0.194) (0.196) (0.197) (0.197) 
Green 0.055 0.733* 0.706* 0.115 0.452 0.768* 
 (0.399) (0.386) (0.393) (0.401) (0.405) (0.399) 
Labour -0.063 0.141 0.032 0.111 0.278 0.071 
 (0.185) (0.181) (0.183) (0.184) (0.185) (0.185) 
Lib Dem -0.262 -0.181 -0.081 -0.149 -0.142 -0.057 
 (0.278) (0.275) (0.276) (0.278) (0.280) (0.279) 
SNP -0.539 -0.808 -0.729 -0.726 -0.467 -0.336 
 (0.484) (0.494) (0.481) (0.479) (0.478) (0.483) 
UKIP 0.271 0.810** 0.842** 0.839** 0.258 0.759** 
 (0.368) (0.341) (0.354) (0.365) (0.360) (0.341) 
AIC 1714.28 1846.38 1840.76 1761.88 1764.87 1793.86 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 









Table A9: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - Party 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.823*** 0.543** 0.620** 0.490* 0.685*** 0.660** 
 (0.256) (0.259) (0.269) (0.255) (0.257) (0.265) 
Male 0.031 0.061 0.074 -0.064 0.050 -0.031 
 (0.132) (0.134) (0.138) (0.132) (0.133) (0.136) 
Income -0.033 0.005 0.109 -0.265 -0.088 0.107 
 (0.301) (0.306) (0.316) (0.300) (0.302) (0.311) 
University -0.207 -0.234* -0.123 -0.142 -0.100 -0.131 
 (0.140) (0.141) (0.146) (0.139) (0.140) (0.144) 
RWA 2.269*** 3.070*** 3.610*** 2.487*** 3.176*** 3.553*** 
 (0.533) (0.543) (0.561) (0.530) (0.534) (0.554) 
SDO 1.011** 0.954** 1.118** 1.060** 1.091*** 1.014** 
 (0.410) (0.419) (0.435) (0.413) (0.418) (0.425) 
Prejudice -0.273 -0.171 0.495 -0.278 -0.192 0.311 
 (0.312) (0.315) (0.328) (0.310) (0.314) (0.321) 
Left Right 0.776* 0.647 1.024** 0.622 0.564 0.992** 
 (0.440) (0.448) (0.466) (0.442) (0.449) (0.456) 
Conservative -0.163 -0.009 -0.180 -0.215 -0.145 -0.173 
 (0.193) (0.197) (0.207) (0.194) (0.196) (0.202) 
Green 0.036 0.397 0.810* -0.179 0.143 0.663 
 (0.399) (0.391) (0.417) (0.403) (0.390) (0.412) 
Labour -0.217 -0.159 -0.315* -0.232 -0.241 -0.253 
 (0.181) (0.183) (0.187) (0.181) (0.183) (0.186) 
Lib Dem -0.358 -0.389 -0.103 -0.197 -0.109 -0.125 
 (0.282) (0.280) (0.285) (0.276) (0.281) (0.282) 
SNP -0.412 -0.500 -0.455 -0.858* -0.686 -0.505 
 (0.470) (0.486) (0.494) (0.489) (0.485) (0.485) 
UKIP 0.056 0.264 0.020 0.184 -0.233 -0.138 
 (0.351) (0.365) (0.395) (0.351) (0.354) (0.370) 
AIC 1779.59 1711.52 1592.45 1786.24 1748.15 1643.49 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 









Table A10: Ordered Logit - High Skill - RWA 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.779*** 0.944*** 1.042*** 0.375 1.018*** 0.932*** 
 (0.254) (0.249) (0.247) (0.251) (0.255) (0.250) 
Male 0.033 0.067 0.317** -0.046 0.121 0.211 
 (0.132) (0.130) (0.129) (0.131) (0.132) (0.131) 
Income -0.212 -0.324 -0.343 0.220 0.015 0.002 
 (0.304) (0.296) (0.296) (0.301) (0.303) (0.301) 
University -0.033 0.038 0.002 -0.132 -0.056 -0.058 
 (0.140) (0.136) (0.136) (0.138) (0.139) (0.138) 
RWA 2.561*** 4.310*** 5.393*** 2.584*** 3.700*** 5.090*** 
 (0.410) (0.415) (0.429) (0.405) (0.413) (0.425) 
AIC 1708.05 1850.18 1874.93 1767.23 1773.55 1819.18 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A11: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - RWA 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.796*** 0.567** 0.647** 0.443* 0.638** 0.678*** 
 (0.249) (0.252) (0.259) (0.248) (0.250) (0.257) 
Male 0.040 0.076 0.138 -0.052 0.067 0.023 
 (0.129) (0.131) (0.135) (0.130) (0.130) (0.133) 
Income -0.024 0.009 0.118 -0.249 -0.060 0.133 
 (0.296) (0.300) (0.309) (0.296) (0.298) (0.305) 
University -0.168 -0.189 -0.077 -0.122 -0.052 -0.090 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.143) (0.136) (0.137) (0.141) 
RWA 3.385*** 4.206*** 5.203*** 3.538*** 4.154*** 4.952*** 
 (0.414) (0.426) (0.451) (0.412) (0.421) (0.443) 
AIC 1780.92 1714.64 1614.88 1788.05 1748.85 1656.17 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A12: Ordered Logit - High Skill - SDO 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.889*** 1.109*** 1.224*** 0.481* 1.163*** 1.101*** 
 (0.253) (0.246) (0.245) (0.250) (0.254) (0.247) 
Male -0.061 -0.090 0.112 -0.138 -0.028 0.020 
 (0.131) (0.127) (0.126) (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) 
Income -0.130 -0.179 -0.226 0.282 0.099 0.111 
 (0.301) (0.291) (0.290) (0.299) (0.300) (0.294) 
University -0.204 -0.248* -0.334*** -0.292** -0.282** -0.372*** 
 (0.134) (0.131) (0.130) (0.133) (0.134) (0.132) 
SDO 1.503*** 2.095*** 3.273*** 1.673*** 2.407*** 3.054*** 
 (0.315) (0.308) (0.318) (0.314) (0.316) (0.317) 
AIC 1725.17 1918.64 1938.54 1780.48 1798.41 1880.07 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A13: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - SDO 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.950*** 0.755*** 0.854*** 0.609** 0.832*** 0.884*** 
 (0.249) (0.250) (0.257) (0.247) (0.248) (0.254) 
Male -0.088 -0.069 -0.051 -0.184 -0.083 -0.153 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.133) (0.129) (0.129) (0.131) 
Income 0.066 0.114 0.263 -0.178 0.047 0.256 
 (0.294) (0.297) (0.304) (0.294) (0.295) (0.300) 
University -0.373*** -0.445*** -0.401*** -0.327** -0.307** -0.395*** 
 (0.132) (0.133) (0.136) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) 
SDO 2.200*** 2.528*** 3.258*** 2.269*** 2.538*** 2.990*** 
 (0.312) (0.318) (0.338) (0.312) (0.316) (0.328) 
AIC 1799.35 1753.93 1663.91 1811.15 1786.05 1706.34 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A14: Ordered Logit - High Skill – Left-right 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.815*** 0.998*** 1.076*** 0.418* 1.055*** 0.945*** 
 (0.254) (0.247) (0.244) (0.250) (0.253) (0.247) 
Male -0.036 -0.036 0.179 -0.113 0.027 0.096 
 (0.131) (0.127) (0.126) (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) 
Income -0.105 -0.208 -0.198 0.322 0.134 0.107 
 (0.301) (0.293) (0.291) (0.298) (0.300) (0.296) 
University -0.236* -0.268** -0.371*** -0.330** -0.328** -0.401*** 
 (0.134) (0.130) (0.129) (0.132) (0.133) (0.131) 
Left Right 1.062*** 1.870*** 2.568*** 1.041*** 1.676*** 2.565*** 
 (0.318) (0.312) (0.313) (0.314) (0.315) (0.318) 
AIC 1737.08 1929.6 1982.32 1798.27 1829.65 1910.48 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A15: Ordered Logit - Low Skill – Left-right 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.839*** 0.612** 0.667*** 0.476* 0.670*** 0.703*** 
 (0.249) (0.250) (0.257) (0.247) (0.248) (0.254) 
Male -0.030 -0.007 0.033 -0.126 -0.010 -0.069 
 (0.128) (0.129) (0.132) (0.128) (0.129) (0.131) 
Income 0.009 0.066 0.191 -0.207 0.012 0.188 
 (0.296) (0.299) (0.305) (0.295) (0.295) (0.302) 
University -0.391*** -0.455*** -0.408*** -0.348*** -0.324** -0.404*** 
 (0.132) (0.132) (0.135) (0.131) (0.131) (0.134) 
Left Right 2.162*** 2.440*** 3.123*** 2.123*** 2.343*** 2.914*** 
 (0.321) (0.325) (0.342) (0.320) (0.323) (0.337) 
AIC 1804.26 1761.57 1675.95 1820.43 1799.39 1715.86 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A16: Ordered Logit - High Skill - Prejudice 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.802*** 0.995*** 1.041*** 0.394 1.035*** 0.926*** 
 (0.254) (0.247) (0.245) (0.250) (0.253) (0.247) 
Male -0.099 -0.145 0.025 -0.178 -0.070 -0.051 
 (0.131) (0.127) (0.126) (0.130) (0.130) (0.128) 
Income -0.083 -0.149 -0.194 0.332 0.157 0.172 
 (0.300) (0.290) (0.289) (0.298) (0.299) (0.293) 
University -0.191 -0.206 -0.246* -0.276** -0.260* -0.303** 
 (0.135) (0.132) (0.130) (0.134) (0.134) (0.133) 
Prejudice 0.993*** 1.607*** 2.563*** 1.025*** 1.502*** 2.261*** 
 (0.264) (0.259) (0.264) (0.262) (0.264) (0.264) 
AIC 1733.99 1926.75 1952.32 1793.84 1825.35 1901.31 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A17: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - Prejudice 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.860*** 0.646*** 0.668*** 0.523** 0.715*** 0.713*** 
 (0.247) (0.247) (0.254) (0.245) (0.245) (0.251) 
Male -0.119 -0.121 -0.140 -0.211* -0.126 -0.218* 
 (0.128) (0.128) (0.132) (0.128) (0.128) (0.131) 
Income 0.156 0.214 0.338 -0.084 0.139 0.330 
 (0.292) (0.294) (0.301) (0.292) (0.291) (0.297) 
University -0.384*** -0.433*** -0.341** -0.334** -0.304** -0.348*** 
 (0.133) (0.133) (0.136) (0.132) (0.132) (0.134) 
Prejudice 0.991*** 1.266*** 2.073*** 1.020*** 1.228*** 1.821*** 
 (0.257) (0.257) (0.271) (0.254) (0.256) (0.265) 
AIC 1836.4 1796.32 1704.71 1850 1831.28 1747.31 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

































Table A18: Ordered Logit - High Skill - Components 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.813*** 0.965*** 1.033*** 0.433* 1.071*** 0.951*** 
 (0.262) (0.256) (0.256) (0.259) (0.262) (0.258) 
Male 0.011 0.048 0.262** -0.070 0.079 0.168 
 (0.134) (0.132) (0.132) (0.133) (0.134) (0.134) 
Income -0.224 -0.343 -0.424 0.206 -0.012 -0.074 
 (0.304) (0.298) (0.300) (0.302) (0.304) (0.303) 
University -0.024 0.064 0.036 -0.126 -0.048 -0.018 
 (0.141) (0.138) (0.138) (0.139) (0.140) (0.140) 
SDO 0.548 0.193 0.989** 0.825** 1.105*** 0.867** 
 (0.416) (0.408) (0.410) (0.413) (0.417) (0.409) 
Prejudice 0.181 0.433 1.079*** 0.139 0.256 0.775** 
 (0.313) (0.306) (0.309) (0.311) (0.313) (0.310) 
Left Right -0.152 0.125 0.377 -0.259 -0.059 0.519 
 (0.388) (0.381) (0.379) (0.383) (0.384) (0.381) 
Aggression 0.922** 1.873*** 2.456*** 0.927** 1.337*** 2.334*** 
 (0.389) (0.382) (0.386) (0.385) (0.388) (0.393) 
Conventionalism 0.570 1.111** 1.537*** 0.476 0.762 1.195** 
 (0.492) (0.481) (0.478) (0.484) (0.486) (0.480) 
Submission 0.658 0.745 -0.461 0.675 0.661 -0.077 
 (0.587) (0.573) (0.577) (0.585) (0.587) (0.580) 
AIC 1714.7 1853.58 1838.43 1771.23 1770.87 1796.1 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 



















Table A19: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - Components 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 1.106*** 0.846*** 0.843*** 0.693*** 0.871*** 0.880*** 
 (0.261) (0.263) (0.273) (0.258) (0.261) (0.270) 
Male 0.068 0.108 0.135 -0.038 0.091 0.020 
 (0.133) (0.135) (0.140) (0.133) (0.134) (0.138) 
Income -0.070 -0.048 0.058 -0.297 -0.109 0.066 
 (0.300) (0.305) (0.316) (0.299) (0.301) (0.311) 
University -0.148 -0.158 -0.031 -0.099 -0.031 -0.042 
 (0.140) (0.141) (0.147) (0.139) (0.140) (0.144) 
SDO 1.026** 1.014** 1.181*** 1.081*** 1.094*** 1.060** 
 (0.409) (0.419) (0.436) (0.412) (0.417) (0.426) 
Prejudice -0.302 -0.190 0.488 -0.319 -0.249 0.276 
 (0.310) (0.314) (0.327) (0.307) (0.312) (0.321) 
Left Right 0.801** 0.769* 1.146*** 0.634 0.627 1.032** 
 (0.388) (0.393) (0.408) (0.387) (0.391) (0.401) 
Aggression 2.350*** 2.746*** 3.201*** 2.267*** 2.517*** 3.061*** 
 (0.385) (0.390) (0.409) (0.382) (0.386) (0.402) 
Conventionalism -1.016** -0.595 0.207 -0.592 -0.094 0.045 
 (0.487) (0.492) (0.513) (0.481) (0.484) (0.502) 
Submission 0.615 0.564 -0.541 0.583 0.400 -0.179 
 (0.582) (0.587) (0.611) (0.575) (0.579) (0.597) 
AIC 1745.64 1679.81 1561.11 1761.7 1723.72 1612.05 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 



















Table A20: Ordered Logit - High Skill - Aggression 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.882*** 1.095*** 1.184*** 0.491* 1.161*** 1.074*** 
 (0.257) (0.251) (0.251) (0.254) (0.258) (0.253) 
Male -0.00003 0.034 0.248* -0.081 0.068 0.157 
 (0.134) (0.131) (0.132) (0.133) (0.134) (0.133) 
Income -0.194 -0.307 -0.416 0.231 0.016 -0.060 
 (0.303) (0.297) (0.298) (0.301) (0.303) (0.302) 
University -0.051 0.030 0.026 -0.147 -0.075 -0.028 
 (0.140) (0.137) (0.137) (0.138) (0.140) (0.139) 
SDO 0.697* 0.422 1.119*** 0.963** 1.278*** 1.008** 
 (0.410) (0.401) (0.403) (0.407) (0.410) (0.403) 
Prejudice 0.263 0.571* 1.182*** 0.220 0.355 0.870*** 
 (0.310) (0.303) (0.305) (0.307) (0.310) (0.307) 
Left Right 0.011 0.374 0.521 -0.106 0.126 0.670* 
 (0.380) (0.373) (0.372) (0.375) (0.376) (0.374) 
Aggression 1.237*** 2.311*** 2.629*** 1.231*** 1.701*** 2.562*** 
 (0.356) (0.351) (0.352) (0.350) (0.354) (0.358) 
AIC 1715.29 1861.75 1845.28 1771.31 1773.56 1799.45 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A21: Ordered Logit - High Skill - Conventionalism 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.712*** 0.779*** 0.848*** 0.326 0.930*** 0.747*** 
 (0.259) (0.253) (0.252) (0.256) (0.259) (0.254) 
Male -0.044 -0.060 0.129 -0.125 -0.004 0.049 
 (0.132) (0.129) (0.129) (0.132) (0.132) (0.131) 
Income -0.200 -0.311 -0.392 0.233 0.019 -0.043 
 (0.303) (0.295) (0.295) (0.300) (0.302) (0.299) 
University -0.122 -0.107 -0.140 -0.224* -0.180 -0.204 
 (0.137) (0.133) (0.133) (0.135) (0.136) (0.135) 
SDO 0.839** 0.687* 1.436*** 1.103*** 1.477*** 1.353*** 
 (0.405) (0.397) (0.400) (0.402) (0.405) (0.399) 
Prejudice 0.330 0.687** 1.335*** 0.295 0.447 1.051*** 
 (0.309) (0.303) (0.306) (0.306) (0.309) (0.307) 
Left Right 0.149 0.630* 0.859** 0.046 0.310 1.008*** 
 (0.375) (0.368) (0.365) (0.369) (0.371) (0.369) 
Conventionalism 1.136*** 1.982*** 2.054*** 1.054** 1.463*** 1.853*** 
 (0.430) (0.419) (0.417) (0.421) (0.420) (0.419) 
AIC 1720.44 1883.28 1877.91 1777.44 1784.72 1832.17 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A22: Ordered Logit - High Skill - Submission 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.818*** 0.971*** 1.038*** 0.431* 1.069*** 0.919*** 
 (0.257) (0.250) (0.249) (0.253) (0.257) (0.251) 
Male -0.035 -0.045 0.120 -0.114 0.010 0.047 
 (0.133) (0.130) (0.129) (0.132) (0.132) (0.131) 
Income -0.212 -0.339 -0.407 0.209 -0.006 -0.061 
 (0.304) (0.296) (0.294) (0.301) (0.303) (0.299) 
University -0.084 -0.049 -0.112 -0.183 -0.130 -0.160 
 (0.139) (0.135) (0.134) (0.137) (0.138) (0.137) 
SDO 0.744* 0.610 1.477*** 1.005** 1.380*** 1.328*** 
 (0.409) (0.399) (0.401) (0.407) (0.411) (0.402) 
Prejudice 0.311 0.661** 1.389*** 0.267 0.439 1.080*** 
 (0.309) (0.304) (0.305) (0.307) (0.309) (0.306) 
Left Right 0.066 0.542 0.886** -0.054 0.219 0.984*** 
 (0.379) (0.372) (0.369) (0.375) (0.376) (0.372) 
Submission 1.477*** 2.347*** 1.725*** 1.460*** 1.833*** 1.874*** 
 (0.484) (0.472) (0.470) (0.480) (0.478) (0.473) 
AIC 1718.13 1880.97 1888.98 1774.41 1782.08 1836.11 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A23: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - Aggression 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 1.000*** 0.792*** 0.851*** 0.637** 0.870*** 0.880*** 
 (0.255) (0.258) (0.268) (0.253) (0.256) (0.265) 
Male 0.075 0.110 0.136 -0.036 0.089 0.021 
 (0.133) (0.135) (0.140) (0.132) (0.134) (0.138) 
Income -0.077 -0.043 0.049 -0.292 -0.102 0.063 
 (0.300) (0.305) (0.315) (0.299) (0.301) (0.311) 
University -0.150 -0.167 -0.020 -0.110 -0.041 -0.038 
 (0.139) (0.140) (0.146) (0.138) (0.139) (0.144) 
SDO 0.961** 1.005** 1.138*** 1.077*** 1.133*** 1.043** 
 (0.402) (0.412) (0.429) (0.404) (0.411) (0.419) 
Prejudice -0.346 -0.207 0.473 -0.333 -0.235 0.269 
 (0.308) (0.311) (0.324) (0.305) (0.309) (0.318) 
Left Right 0.738* 0.761** 1.101*** 0.626* 0.663* 1.015*** 
 (0.380) (0.385) (0.400) (0.380) (0.385) (0.394) 
Aggression 2.313*** 2.777*** 3.088*** 2.303*** 2.611*** 3.019*** 
 (0.353) (0.359) (0.375) (0.352) (0.356) (0.370) 
AIC 1746.04 1677.5 1557.89 1759.49 1720.21 1608.14 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A24: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - Conventionalism 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.877*** 0.589** 0.571** 0.482* 0.630** 0.606** 
 (0.256) (0.257) (0.266) (0.254) (0.255) (0.263) 
Male -0.062 -0.036 -0.027 -0.151 -0.040 -0.130 
 (0.130) (0.132) (0.136) (0.130) (0.131) (0.134) 
Income -0.032 -0.0004 0.087 -0.265 -0.063 0.096 
 (0.297) (0.301) (0.310) (0.296) (0.298) (0.306) 
University -0.341** -0.380*** -0.258* -0.287** -0.235* -0.266* 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.140) (0.134) (0.135) (0.138) 
SDO 1.555*** 1.604*** 1.703*** 1.576*** 1.632*** 1.593*** 
 (0.396) (0.401) (0.415) (0.399) (0.402) (0.407) 
Prejudice 0.027 0.163 0.812** 0.002 0.072 0.632** 
 (0.303) (0.304) (0.317) (0.300) (0.304) (0.310) 
Left Right 1.404*** 1.459*** 1.779*** 1.242*** 1.242*** 1.693*** 
 (0.373) (0.374) (0.388) (0.370) (0.374) (0.382) 
Conventionalism -0.040 0.493 0.979** 0.352 0.857** 0.923** 
 (0.417) (0.418) (0.433) (0.412) (0.412) (0.426) 
AIC 1790.31 1739.03 1625.45 1802.97 1772.21 1674.46 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 

























Table A25: Ordered Logit - Low Skill - Submission 
 Dependent variable: 
 W. Europe E. Europe Muslim C.wealth E. Asia Africa 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Age 0.863*** 0.628** 0.655** 0.510** 0.707*** 0.690*** 
 (0.252) (0.254) (0.262) (0.250) (0.252) (0.259) 
Male -0.029 -0.009 -0.019 -0.124 -0.021 -0.117 
 (0.131) (0.132) (0.136) (0.131) (0.131) (0.134) 
Income -0.070 -0.039 0.075 -0.296 -0.091 0.078 
 (0.297) (0.301) (0.310) (0.297) (0.298) (0.306) 
University -0.267* -0.307** -0.221 -0.221 -0.171 -0.219 
 (0.137) (0.138) (0.142) (0.136) (0.137) (0.140) 
SDO 1.290*** 1.374*** 1.621*** 1.357*** 1.454*** 1.478*** 
 (0.399) (0.405) (0.419) (0.402) (0.406) (0.410) 
Prejudice -0.109 0.047 0.790** -0.101 0.005 0.586* 
 (0.304) (0.305) (0.317) (0.301) (0.304) (0.311) 
Left Right 1.126*** 1.204*** 1.692*** 1.015*** 1.068*** 1.564*** 
 (0.377) (0.379) (0.393) (0.374) (0.379) (0.387) 
Submission 1.313*** 1.680*** 1.307*** 1.438*** 1.681*** 1.472*** 
 (0.478) (0.481) (0.488) (0.473) (0.473) (0.482) 
AIC 1782.7 1728.06 1623.38 1794.39 1763.77 1669.8 
Observations 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 1,022 



























Research has indicated that news consumption may be fueling rises in affective polarization. 
As media choices increase, it is likely that individual factors, such as personality, may take on 
a larger role in determining the types of exposure individuals receive. Personality may also 
moderate the impact of news consumption as well as directly influence levels of affective 
polarization. In this analysis of an original survey (N = 855) of Democrats and Republicans, I 
show that Big Five personality traits influence cross-ideological news consumption, as well as 
attitudes towards news consumption. I find no evidence that open individuals consume more 
cross-ideological news. However, I find that extraverted individuals are likely to consume more 
news overall, including more cross-ideological news. Extraversion is also associated with 
negative reactions to polarizing content. Agreeable individuals, in contrast, were found to be 
associated with greater ideologically homogenous consumption patterns. Although 
consumption patterns were found to predict out-party hostility, these were not moderated by 
personality traits. Personality, however, was found to have significant direct effects on this 






















Public opinion polls suggest that partisans of both of the two major parties are increasingly 
willing to express a dislike of those on the “other side”. In 1960, less than 10% of Americans 
would be displeased if their child married someone of a different party. By 2010, that had risen 
to about 30% among Democrats, and almost 50% among Republicans, as reported by Iyengar 
et al. (2012). This phenomenon of ‘affective polarization’ has been shown to impact Americans’ 
lives in diverse ways, from shortening the time families spend together at Thanksgiving (Chen 
and Rohla, 2018), to online dating profiles (Kiefer, 2017), and in an experimental setting, 
influencing hiring decisions (Iyengar and Westwood, 2015).  
 
The consequences of this divide are potentially destabilizing for American democracy and 
social cohesion. It may even represent a threat to American lives. Currently, as the world is in 
the grip of the Covid-19 pandemic, the US has struggled to come together to fight this disease. 
Instead, we are seeing the politicization of potential treatments. From the potential uses (or 
dangers) of Hydroxychloroquine, to the use of masks, to the reopening of schools. In fact, 
political affiliation is largely driving beliefs about the pandemic and social distancing behaviors 
(Makridis and Rothwell, 2020). This may not, of course, be solely the result of affective 
polarization. Differences in opinion on these issues could naturally be the result of long-
standing ideological, dispositional, and policy differences between the two parties. Yet it is 
hard to ignore the possibility that the growing distaste between the two parties is exacerbating 
what is already a difficult, contentious, and critical issue. 
 
In fact, while these differences in attitudes do exist, people tend to perceive them as even larger 
than they are. Democrats and Republicans exaggerate the differences party members have on 






none, or just some of Republicans, thought it necessary to wear masks in public. According to 
the same poll, 68% of Republicans stated people should wear masks in public (Edwards-Levy, 
2020). These false beliefs may be further fueling the dislike between the parties.  
 
These misunderstandings about Covid-19 attitudes and behaviors parallel general 
misunderstandings of the policy distance between the two parties (Levundusky and Malhotra, 
2016; Yudkin et al., 2019). Much of the growing dislike Americans are showing for their cross-
party fellow citizens may stem from warped views of what the other side actually believes. 
Partisan news sources, especially when focusing on the negative aspects of the opposing party, 
may be driving much of these misperceptions. Yudkin et al. (2019) found that increased media 
consumption increases misperceptions about the opposing party – with more partisan sources 
having much larger effects than more neutral ones. Indeed, a growing literature has developed 
showing that media consumption patterns may be a large factor driving affective polarization 
(e.g., Garrett et al., 2014; Hmielowski et al., 2016; Hopkins and Ladd, 2013; Lau et al., 2016; 
Lelkes et al., 2017; Levundusky, 2013; Stroud, 2010). 
 
The large role that media plays in affective polarization is likely due to the increased number 
of choices available to consumers, first with the rise of cable television, and subsequently with 
the rise of the internet. People are naturally inclined to consume news that accords with their 
beliefs. They may also be drawn to news that exaggerates the threats posed by the “other side”. 
As media options increase, so does the ability of consumers to seek out and consume polarizing 
content. However, not all individuals have the same preferences for polarizing media, and 
therefore an abundance of choices is likely to magnify the impact of personality. Early research 
indicated that one’s personality influences general media preferences and consumption patterns 






influence consumption patterns linked to affective polarization, such as consuming cross-
ideological content (Kim and Kim, 2018) and negative news (Bachleda et al., 2020).  
 
This study is based on an original survey in the US using the Prolific survey platform. It 
measures media usage as well as attitudes towards the media, in order to get a fuller picture of 
how personality influences overall consumption patterns. Furthermore, to assess the impact of 
negative portrayals of the out-party, respondents were given either supportive or hostile 
editorials to read about the opposing side. The impacts of these treatments were measured, as 
well as attitudes towards the editorials, to see how individuals with different personalities think 
about and react to this kind of content.  
 
The results add to the small but growing literature on this topic in three main ways.  
 
First, although open individuals claim they seek out cross-ideological news content, this is not 
reflected in reported consumption levels. On the other hand, two other traits do seem to play a 
role in cross-ideological consumption. Extraverted individuals report consuming the most news 
overall, including cross-ideological news. Additionally, extraverted individuals were found to 
rate editorials hostile to the opposing party negatively. Agreeable individuals, in contrast, were 
found to be most likely to report “echo chamber” consumption patterns. Agreeableness was 
also found to predict getting upset by the news, as well as a dislike of offensive content. These 
findings may indicate agreeable individuals seek out more comfortable news – which results 
in less cross-ideological consumption. 
 
Second, I show that both media consumption patterns and exposure to polarizing editorials 






and cross-ideological consumption played a role, with matched consumption increasing 
hostility, and cross consumption lowering it. Similarly, reading an editorial sharply critical of 
the other side increased hostility, while reading an editorial displaying more understanding and 
support towards the other side lowered it. 
 
Third, these relationships were not moderated by personality traits. However, I do find direct 
relationships between personality traits and hostility towards the opposing side. Agreeableness 
and extraversion are associated with less hostility, while neuroticism is associated with more. 
These findings, however, depend on the measure of hostility being used. Extraversion predicts 
less hostility towards the party as a whole, while agreeableness and neuroticism are associated 
with hostility towards regular members of the parties. 
 
4.2 A changing media landscape  
  
Prior (2007) demonstrated that the transformations, first to broadcast based news consumption, 
and then to cable news consumption, had profound effects on the public – on political 
knowledge and political behavior. His research also demonstrated that it is not merely the 
nature of news programs which are relevant, but the alternative options available, against which 
news programs compete. The competition both between news providers and with non-news 
media has gone into overdrive with the emergence of the internet. Currently more Americans 
frequently get their news from social media than newspapers (Shearer, 2018). These changes 
have devastated the traditional news media. Over the past 15 years over 1 in 5 American 
newspapers has shut down, leaving many communities without a local paper (Takenaga, 2019). 
Newsroom employment in the US has shrunk by 23% between 2007 and 2019 (Grieco, 2020), 






That we are seeing more hostile affective attitudes towards the out-party (for a recent review, 
see: Iyengar et al., 2019) can be partially attributed to these changes that have been taking place 
within the news media sector. By changing the format and availability of news sources, certain 
dynamics emerge which may exacerbate this relationship. The options available to consumers 
allow people to choose to consume news compatible with their prior beliefs, leading to further 
reinforcement and perhaps intensification of these beliefs. Moreover, due to a sensitivity to 
negative news and outgroup threats, people may choose to consume sources that paint an unfair 
and overly negative picture of their political opponents. These tendencies people have may 
further drive the sector into providing content which is one-sided and negative, due to market 
forces and better tracking and analytical capabilities.  
 
Selective exposure is an old idea in psychology that has recently been revived as an explanation 
for the patterns in ideological and affective polarization we are seeing today (e.g., Garrett et 
al., 2014; Lau et al., 2016; Stroud, 2010). While previously its role has been viewed as limited, 
the transformations which have taken place in the media sector have increased its relevance. 
There are two questions to consider: First, to what extent do individuals actually choose to 
restrict their news consumption to one side? And second, what effect does a restricted 
consumption pattern have?  
 
Explanations for why individuals would choose to restrict their consumption to “their side” are 
often based on theories of motivated reasoning and confirmation bias (Lodge and Taber, 2013). 
These argue that people choose to consume information which confirms their existing 
viewpoints and avoid information which challenges those viewpoints. This would be prior and 
in addition to a tendency to interpret information in a way which supports those viewpoints 






ideological bubbles, recent data indicates Democrats and Republicans do have very different 
sources of news they use and trust (Jurkowitz et al., 2020).7 Experimental research also shows 
that individuals prefer to consume news that corresponds to their ideological views (Iyengar 
and Hahn 2009). Selective exposure, however, does not merely reflect existing attitudes. The 
introduction of Fox News into local television markets, a natural experiment, was found to 
reinforce Republican loyalties and increase Republican vote intentions (Hopkins and Ladd, 
2013). It stands to reason that affective polarization could be a product of similar processes. 
And indeed, access to broadband has been found to increase partisan hostility (Lelkes et al., 
2017). These findings provide evidence that media usage does more than merely reflect 
existing positions. 
 
Arguably, a key reason why selective exposure may increase affective polarization is due to 
negative and hostile representations of the out-party (Levundusky, 2013). This is an illustration 
of the general tendency to be drawn to negative and threatening news (e.g., “if it bleeds it 
leads”). News sources have a tendency to focus on the scandals of the out-party (e.g., Puglisi 
and Snyder, 2011) more than they do on the scandals of the in-party. Research has also shown 
that affective polarization is most increased through negative depictions of the other side, rather 
than positive depictions of one’s own (Smith and Searles, 2014). Both the behavior of the 
writers and editors, as well as the response of the viewers, are likely due to natural tendencies 
to look for threats and focus on the faults of the outgroup. After all, it is better to be excessively 
vigilant than risk catastrophe. Negative portrayals of the other side likely leads to the findings 
(Levundusky and Malhotra, 2016; Yudkin et al., 2019) that media consumption increases cross-
party misperceptions, such as skewed views of your political opponents and exaggerated views 
of the differences between members of the two parties.  
 






Any media environment with large numbers of partisan choices available to consumers would 
likely lead to increased affective polarization due to consumers choosing to selectively 
consume partisan media, often with menacing portrayals of the outgroup. Technological 
innovations may worsen this pattern. Unlike with previous news technologies, the internet 
allows media companies to get fine-grained data on which specific stories attract the most 
attention. As individuals may be drawn to negative portrayals of the other side, this technology 
may lead organizations to focus on stories, headlines, and angles which may be making this 
affective polarization worse (Klein, 2020; Munger et al., 2020). This is not even to mention the 
fact that suggestion algorithms may recommend sources which only intensify and reinforce 
existing echo chambers. 
 
Both of these patterns, choosing to consume ideologically consistent media and being drawn 
to negative portrayals of the other side, are the result of human psychology. As such, there is 
likely variation in these tendencies due to personality. 
 
 
4.3 An increasing role for personality 
 
As the media landscape becomes more varied, it is reasonable to assume that one’s personality 
will have a larger role in determining what one becomes exposed to. This argument is similar 
to the argument in Prior (2007). As media choices increased, he witnessed a greater divergence 
between different groups of individuals, based on their preferences. Our personalities influence 
our preferences enormously, and as a result, the more varied the options there are, the more our 
individual differences will lead us into a unique environment. This means that people will begin 






The two main areas where this is most relevant to affective polarization is, first, the tendency 
towards selective exposure, and second, the tendency to be attracted to negative news or 
negative portrayals of the other side. 
 
This chapter, as well as the research it builds upon, are based on the Big Five, the most 
commonly used personality measure in psychology (John et al., 2008). It consists of five traits. 
Openness describes how open individuals are to new experiences and ideas. Conscientiousness 
describes how orderly or rule-following a person tends to be. Extraversion describes how 
outgoing and extraverted individuals are. Agreeableness represents how nice or empathetic a 
person is. And neuroticism (also known as emotional stability) describes how sensitive to 
negative emotions a person is. For several decades these traits have been studied in political 
psychology to see how associated they are with various political attitudes. A large literature 
has developed, finding persistent influences of these personality traits. Largest and most 
consistent has been the relationships between openness and left-wing views and 
conscientiousness and right-wing views (e.g., Gerber et al., 2011b; Jost et al., 2009). All 
personality traits, however, have been found at times to be related to political attitudes.  
 
This study looks into three ways personality could be influencing levels of affective 
polarization. First, one’s personality may drive media consumption habits, with the media itself 
influencing levels of hostility – a mediation relationship. Second, one’s personality may 
moderate the effect of media consumption. In other words, the same content affects people 
differently, based on who they are. Third, personality may have a direct effect on hostility 
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Notes: The green line represents a direct relationship between personality and affective 
polarization. Blue lines represent a mediation relationship – personality influences what media 
is consumed, and then that media impacts levels of affective polarization. The red line 
represents a moderation relationship – one’s personality moderates the media’s effect on 
affective polarization levels. 
 
Initial studies into the relationships between news consumption preferences and personality 
(Mondak, 2010; Gerber et al., 2011a) did not focus on selective exposure. In fact, there has 
been very little research so far into the role personality may play in selective exposure. I could 
not find any research which showed how personality may impact motivated reasoning 
generally. Kim and Kim (2018) examine the question of whether openness predicts cross-
cutting news exposure. On the one hand, one could argue that since openness has an association 
with left-wing viewpoints, higher levels of openness should only predict more left-wing 
consumption. On the other hand, one could argue that by its very nature open individuals are 
more open to new viewpoints, so openness should predict cross-cutting consumption, 
regardless of one’s ideological roots. Using the ANES, they find openness is only associated 
with left-wing consumption, not with general cross-cutting news consumption. These findings 
were attenuated but not eliminated by ideology and political identification. In other words, 
while Republicans with higher levels of openness consumed more left-wing media, Democrats 
with higher levels of openness did not consume more right-wing media. Thus, only when there 
was a lack of alignment between the natural tendency of the trait and one’s political attitudes, 






Bachleda et al. (2020) examine whether personality predicts negativity biases in news selection 
(NBNS). As it is likely that negative portrayals of the outgroup play a large role in increasing 
levels of affective polarization, this negativity bias is especially relevant. They found that, in 
Canada, conscientiousness predicted an increased preference for NBNS, while extraversion 
and agreeableness a decreased preference. Despite controlling for ideology, they argue that the 
relationship between conscientiousness and NBNS may be due to the relationship between 
conscientiousness and conservatism. Conservatives may be more sensitive to potential threats 
(Hibbing et al., 2014) and therefore may react more strongly to negative stimuli (Dodd et al., 
2012), including negative news.8 As this may be a fundamental characteristic, controlling for 
ideology may not eliminate the association between the personality precursors and this 
phenomenon. They argue the associations between agreeableness and extraversion may be 
related to the findings (discussed below) that agreeable and extraverted individuals have lower 
negative partisan affect (Webster, 2018). These traits may predispose individuals to a form of 
positivity which can be seen both in news selection as well as judgments of the other side.  
 
Beyond influencing what we choose to consume, one’s personality is likely to impact how we 
interpret and are affected by that consumption. Just as two individuals may experience the same 
event very differently, so would we expect them to experience the same news or editorial 
content differently. What one person finds incisive, might come off as pompous to another. 
What one finds offensive, another might find funny. To my knowledge, this has not been 
studied directly.  
 
 
8 It is worth noting that recent research casts doubt on the claim that conservatives have stronger 






The direct relationships between personality traits and affective polarization have been 
examined by Webster (2018). Using data from the 2012 ANES, he finds that extraverted 
individuals are significantly less likely to dislike the opposing party. Conditional on disliking 
the opposing party, agreeableness is associated with lower levels of dislike. He argues this is a 
two-step process. Extraverted individuals are more likely to come in contact with members of 
the opposing party, due to having larger networks, and this contact will decrease the likelihood 
of negative affective judgments. Agreeable individuals, in contrast, will not necessarily have 
more contact with members of the opposing party, but due to the natural characteristics of 
agreeableness (e.g., friendliness, empathy), they will be less negative in their appraisals of the 
opposing party.   
 
We are only starting to get a grasp of the three ways personality may drive affective polarization, 
as discussed above. Many of those findings need to be corroborated, and there are still some 
questions not yet investigated. How does personality moderate the effect of news consumption? 
Do people with different personalities react differently to polarizing content? This study aims 
to bring these strands of research together, with multiple forms of measurement, in order to 
provide a fuller picture of the relationships between personality, news consumption, and 













4.4 Hypotheses  
 
This study includes pre-registered hypotheses focused on the relationships between personality 
and news consumption.9 There are three main areas of hypotheses which I pre-registered. The 
first area concerns how personality predicts media selection. The second area is about how 
media consumption impacts affective polarization. The third and most speculative area 
explores how personality may moderate these effects of media consumption. The first two sets 
of hypotheses therefore relate to the mediation relationships shown in Figure 1, while the last 




As open individuals are thought to be open to new ideas, this trait is naturally connected to 
cross-ideological consumption. This has previously been examined by Kim and Kim (2018) 
Building on their research, I will both look at left- and right-wing news consumption, as they 
did, as well as the overall balance of consumption.  
 
H1: Higher levels of openness will predict cross-cutting and more balanced media 
consumption patterns for members of both parties.  
 
 
9 See: https://osf.io/q965p Note: The order and wording are slightly different here. Hypotheses 
about how openness and conscientiousness may relate to left- and right-wing news 
consumption are omitted here. Also, as I will discuss, hypotheses about heterogenous effects 






By looking at the overall balance, I will see if less open individuals are more likely to live in 
an echo chamber. It is arguably that consumption pattern which is most critical for 




Before measuring the moderating effects of personality, it is necessary to establish that media 
consumption itself increases measures of affective polarization. 
 
H2: Biased media consumption patterns will predict higher levels of affective polarization. 
 
The above hypothesis focuses on existing (reported) consumption patterns. These patterns, 
however, may reflect existing levels of polarization. Therefore, in order to better measure the 
impact of consuming polarizing content, the participants read editorial vignettes which were 
either supportive or hostile towards the opposing political party. The following two hypotheses 
concern the impact of those editorials. 
 
H3: Reading an editorial harshly hostile to the opposing side will increase affective 
polarization. 
 
H4: Reading an editorial sympathetic to the opposing side will decrease affective polarization. 
 
It is necessary to examine the effects of both hostile and sympathetic editorials, to establish 









There is no reason to believe that everyone will respond to the same media in the same ways. 
As such, I preregistered a number of hypotheses on the moderating effects of personality traits. 
I note in the preregistration that these were the most speculative hypotheses. For reasons of 
parsimony and clarity, however, these can be condensed in the chapter to:  
 
H5: Personality traits will moderate the effects of news consumption on affective polarization. 
 
Direct effects of personality 
 
The preregistered hypotheses solely concerned relationships involving media consumption. 
However, as has been discussed above, one’s personality likely directly influences hostility 
towards the opposing party.  
 
H6: Extraversion and agreeableness will predict lower levels of affective polarization. 
 
This prediction derives from Webster (2018). Note, however, that he measured hostility 
differently, focusing specifically on negative partisanship. Also, his research involved a two-
step process, as discussed above. That said, it is likely, due to contact patterns (extraversion) 
and overall friendliness (agreeableness), that these two traits would predict overall lower levels 









4.5 Data and Design 
 
To better understand these relationships, an original survey was launched in December of 2019 
among Democrats and Republicans, through the Prolific platform. Respondents were paid 
£1.20 as compensation for their time and effort.10 In total, 434 Democrats responded and 421 
Republicans. Although independents were excluded through filtering, a few answered the 
survey anyway, and their responses have been removed. The sample is roughly evenly split 
between men and women.11  
 
The survey consists of two major parts. The first part assesses how personality may relate to 
existing (reported) news consumption patterns, as well as attitudes towards the news. This 
allows us to understand better how personality may influence the balance of news-intake and 
preferences for the tone of the news (e.g., negativity).  
 
The second part of the survey brings in an experimental analysis to more precisely measure 
how people respond to polarizing news content, and the degree that response is influenced by 
personality. This section had the respondents read one of two short editorials (with a control 
group not reading any editorial). 40% read an editorial which harshly attacked the opposing 
political party, while 40% read an editorial which was more accepting and supportive of the 
opposing political party. The goal here is to directly test how polarizing media content may be 
received by individuals with different personalities. After reading the editorials, individuals 
 
10 Initially respondents were paid £1.50. The amount was reduced due to the incredible speed 
they demonstrated in answering the questionnaire.   
11 Respondents (5 individuals) were excluded who finished the survey unreasonably quickly. 
Respondents (98 individuals) were also excluded from the second part of the analysis, which 
required them to read editorials, if they read the editorials unreasonably quickly. Details of the 






answered feeling thermometer questions for the two parties, as well as rated the articles on a 
number of metrics. To read the editorials, see the appendix.  
 
Beyond the main measures discussed below, all models included demographic control 
variables: age, gender, income, and education level. 
 
Measurement of Affective Polarization 
 
Measurement of affective polarization was done in two ways.  
 
In the beginning of the survey, respondents were asked what percentage of Democrats and 
Republicans were accurately described by four adjectives: Greedy, Hateful, Responsible, and 
Honest. This was done in order to focus on attitudes towards individual supporters of the parties, 
and not the party itself. From these responses, I created a scale based on the mean judgment of 
the opposing party. For each respondent, I calculated a value based on their scores of their out-
party. As two of these adjectives are positive, and two are negative, I reversed the values for 
the positive ones, and averaged the four scores together. This scale therefore is solely focused 
on the respondents’ assessment of their out-party. 
 
I focused on out-party hostility for two primary reasons. First, the key issue in the affective 
polarization literature is a rising dislike of the opposing side, not a rising affection for one’s 
own. Second, it is worth establishing the degree one’s affinity towards one’s own party predicts 
this hostility – and therefore if a measure of this affinity were included the outcome variable, 







As mentioned above, after reading the editorials, respondents were also given feeling 
thermometers for the two parties. This would serve as a second measure, to assess the effects 
of the editorials. A different design was employed here to try to limit bias in the results based 
on how the respondents had previously answered the adjective-based questions. Despite the 
differing methodologies, the two measures were correlated, as expected (r = 0.53). 
 
Measurement of News Consumption Patterns 
 
In order to assess the respondents’ media selection, they were asked how often they consumed 
media from a number of sources.12 Factor analysis was run on their responses and left-wing 
and right-wing media factors were established. See the appendix for descriptive data about the 
factors. 
 
The left-wing sources consist of:  
Sources such as Slate, Buzzfeed, Daily Kos, or Huffington Post,  
MSNBC,  
CNN.  
The right-wing sources consist of:  
Fox News,  
Talk Radio programs like Rush Limbaugh or the Sean Hannity Show, 
Breitbart News,  
Sources such as the Drudge Report, Redstate.com, or HotAir.com,  
Religious news sources like The Christian Post or the Christian News Network. 
 
12 These were taken from Yudkin et al. (2019), which uses a standard categorization of media 






To create measures of overall left- and right-wing news consumption, the scores for these items 
were averaged together. Note, however, that these two measures are not strictly comparable. 
There are five right-wing news sources, and three left-wing sources, and baseline consumption 
levels are different between the two. Furthermore, the two scales are correlated with each other 
(r = .25), indicating that individuals who are more likely to consume news from one side are 
more likely to consume news from “the other side” as well. In fact, every single news source 
is positively correlated with every other news source. For more detailed information about how 
often Democrats and Republicans consumed the various news sources, see the appendix. 
 
In order to estimate the general effects of cross-ideological consumption and matched-
ideological consumption, the left-wing and right-wing scales were combined into cross and 
matched consumption scales. Right-wing consumption among Democrats and left-wing 
consumption among Republicans were turned into a measure of cross consumption. Similarly, 
left-wing consumption among Democrats and right-wing consumption among Republicans 
were turned into a measure of matched consumption. 
 
As some level of cross consumption is the norm, and to better understand who is likely to select 
into a more homogenous pattern of consumption, for some analyses I use a measure of balanced 
consumption. This is simply matched consumption minus cross consumption. Due to 
differences between the left- and right-wing news measures, as well as differences in 
consumption patterns, the balanced consumption variable differs between members of the two 
parties (Democrat mean: 0.64, Republican mean: 0.45. On a 0 - 1 scale). All analysis involving 








Measurement of Ideology 
 
As ideology is a strong predictor of affective polarization (e.g., Rognowski and Sutherland, 
2016; Webster and Abramowitz, 2017), it is important to measure this specifically. Instead of 
ideological self-placement, I opted to create an ideological scale based on responses to four 
questions, which target four different political topics: the environment, immigration, marriage 
equality, and wealth distribution. The questions ask the respondents to place themselves 
between two extreme positions on the issues and were used previously in, for example, the 
Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker, Hooghe, et al., 2020). Responses were averaged together 
to create a scale. For some analyses, an additional scale was created from this called 
‘ideological extremism’. This measures how far the respondent is from the mid-point on the 
ideology scale. Individuals on the wings of the parties are likely to be more affectively 
polarized. A scale which goes from far-left to far-right may thus miss this important feature. 
 
Measuring issue stances risks missing something a left-right self-placement scale may capture, 
namely the identity aspect of ideological placement. However, to better capture this identity 
aspect of affective polarization, partisan identity, which has been argued to be a central 
component in affective polarization (e.g., Mason, 2018), can be measured as well. This was 
done by asking respondents how strongly they identify with their party.  
 
Measurement of Personality 
 
The personalities of the respondents were assessed using the Mini-IPIP Big 5 20-item test 
(Donnellan et al., 2006). Each trait is assessed using four questions, with the goal of getting a 






The Cronbach’s alphas are as follows: openness: 0.75, conscientiousness: 0.73, extraversion: 
0.86, agreeableness: 0.82, neuroticism: 0.79. Furthermore, there were no items which were 
found to be problematic. The correlations between the traits were all under r = 0.3, with three 
exceptions: conscientiousness and neuroticism (r = -0.42), extraversion and agreeableness (r 
= 0.31), and extraversion and neuroticism (r = -0.33). These correlations are sufficiently low 
that it is unlikely to cause problems for the statistical analysis. However, the lack of 
orthogonality between some of the traits indicates there may be some conceptual problems with 




Figure 2 displays descriptive differences between members of the two parties. There are two 
main trends to note. First, the two parties are almost exactly equally partisan and, relatedly, 
equally hostile to each other. Second, we see some degree of asymmetric polarization for news 
consumption and ideological extremism. Democrats consume roughly 30% as much right-wing 
news as Republicans, while Republicans consume approximately 67% as much left-wing news 
as Democrats. Furthermore, Democrats demonstrate more ideological extremism than the 
Republicans do.  
 
However, this should be interpreted very carefully. The two measures of news consumption 
are not easily comparable, as they rely on a differing number of sources, and some are much 
more seldomly consumed. This is most clearly seen in the fact that, according to these measures, 
Republicans here consume slightly more left-wing media than they do right-wing. Moreover, 
the fact that Democrats show more ideological extremism may reflect that the overall electorate 






sample, and therefore these findings relate solely to the sample here. See the appendix for more 
descriptive statistics on the sample.  
 
Figure 2: Average differences between parties on variables of interest 
  
Notes: Out-party hostility measures adjective-based assessment of members of the opposing 
party. Right- and left-wing correspond to right- and left-wing news consumption levels. 
Ideological extremism indicates distance from the midpoint position. Partisanship measures 
















Does one’s personality influence the likelihood of polarized media consumption patterns?  
 
Figure 3 displays regression results, showing models for matched and cross media consumption, 
as well as whether the respondents believe they make an effort to consume news from the other 
political side.13  
 
Figure 3: News consumption patterns 
 
Notes: OLS regressions. Demographic controls as well as controls for party, ideological 




13 Matched consumption refers to consumption of the left-wing news measure by Democrats 






Openness was identified as a possible predictor of cross-ideological news consumption. We 
see that it strongly predicts the belief that one consumes cross-ideological news. However, it 
was not found to predict actual reported consumption levels. Agreeable individuals are also 
more likely to claim they make an effort to consume cross-ideological news, and yet do not 
demonstrate that in their reported consumption patterns.  
 
The strongest and most consistent finding above is that extraverted individuals are predicted to 
consume more news overall, including news from both sides, and also report making an effort 
to consume cross-ideological news. Previous research has identified extraversion as related to 
increased news consumption (Mondak, 2010), however it has not been fully understood why, 
nor was the trait identified for this paper as a likely predictor of cross-ideological consumption. 
Clearly, future research should focus more on the role extraversion plays in news consumption.  
 
An alternative strategy is to look at the balance of consumption – the difference between 
matched- and cross-ideological consumption. As a key driver of affectively polarized attitudes 
may be echo chamber-like consumption patterns, it is worth focusing not on those who have 
balanced consumption, but those who have more homogenous consumption patterns. A 
drawback to this analysis is that we lose any measure of the amount of news being consumed. 
The fact that extraverted individuals report consuming more news overall is missed in the 
below analysis. Additionally, one may consume relatively more “matched” content, but if one 
still consumes quite a lot of “cross” content, the implications become much murkier. Thus, it 









Figure 4: Personality predictors of “echo chamber” consumption 
  
Notes: OLS regressions. Grey coefficients are without controls for party, ideological extremism, 
or partisanship. Black includes them. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All variables 
min-max transformed. Coefficients above 0 indicate more matched consumption than cross 
consumption.  
 
In Figure 4 we can see that, without controlling for party, ideological extremism, or 
partisanship, conscientiousness predicts less homogenous news consumption, while openness 
and agreeableness predict more homogenous consumption. After bringing in these covariates, 
only agreeableness remains statistically significant. This indicates more agreeable individuals 
are more likely than less agreeable individuals to favor ideologically consistent content, 
regardless of political affiliation or ideological leanings. This is especially noteworthy in that 
agreeable individuals were predicted to claim they made an effort to consume media from the 







These findings lend no support to the idea that open individuals are more likely to seek out 
cross-ideological news sources – though they claim that they do. Moreover, low-open 
individuals are not more likely to have bubble-like consumption patterns. Thus, we can reject 
H1. We do find, however, that extraverted individuals are most likely to report consuming 
cross-ideological content. Their news balance is also fairly even, as they report consuming 
much matching content as well. Agreeable individuals are those most likely to report 
homogenous new consumption patterns.  
 
This finding for agreeableness can be fleshed out with supporting evidence from data on 
attitudes towards news. Beyond reporting consumption patterns, the respondents were asked 
several questions about how they felt about the news, as well as how the news made them feel. 
The results of some of these questions can be seen in Figure 5. Agreeableness (as well as 
neuroticism) was associated with getting upset by the news. Additionally, agreeableness was 

















Figure 5: News consumption attitudes 
 
Notes: OLS regressions. Demographic controls as well as controls for ideology and partisan 
strength. Lines represent 95% confidence intervals. All variable min-max transformed. 
 
This may indicate that agreeable individuals seek out more comfortable news. That is, less 
offensive and upsetting, as well as more ideologically consistent. However, future research 
would have to test this more thoroughly. 
 
Do polarizing media and polarized media balances predict out-party hostility?  
 
Before delving into whether personality moderates the effects of consuming polarizing content, 
it is worth first establishing what the general effects of such content are. First, we can examine 








Figure 6: Predicted out-party hostility by consumption type and party 
 
Notes: Lines show predicted values when the other variable is held at its mean. Variables min-
max transformed. Shaded regions represent 95% confidence intervals. Controlling for 
demographics as well as ideological extremism and partisan strength. Higher values on the y-
axis represent greater hostility. 
 
Figure 6 shows that, for members of both parties, high levels of matched consumption are 
associated with more hostility towards members of the other party, while high levels of cross 
consumption are associated with less hostility. This is after controlling for how extreme the 
ideological views of the respondents are, as well as degree of partisanship. It is interesting to 
note that we do not see a drastic difference between matched and cross consumption patterns. 
If individuals became more affectively polarized through negative portrayals of the out-party, 
we would expect that the matched lines would have steeper slopes than the cross lines.  
 
These results may indicate that cross consumption has a large depolarizing effect. Another 






polarized choose to consume more matched content and less cross content, while those who 
are less polarized choose to consume more cross content and less matched content. These 
explanations are not mutually exclusive. 
 
In order to establish more confidently a causal effect, the respondents read short editorials 
about the opposing party. 40% received an openly hostile editorial (polarizing), 40% read a 
supportive editorial (depolarizing), and 20% received no editorial, to serve as a control group. 
After reading the editorials, the respondents were given party feeling thermometers. The results 
of this can be seen in Table 1.  
 
Table 1: Feeling thermometers for opposing party 
 
Editorial   Democrat respondent   Republican respondent 
 
Critical  17.37    17.47  
Supportive  22.45    28.41 
Control  22.22    23.99 
 
Notes: Ratings are out of 100.  
 
 
Pooling the results together for the two parties, and controlling for demographics, ideological 
extremism, party, and partisan strength, both the supportive (b = -.041, p < .05) as well as 
critical editorials (b = .054, p < .01) were statistically significant predictors of these 
thermometer ratings. Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 display these results.  
 
This indicates that both polarizing and depolarizing content can strengthen or weaken affective 
polarization, respectively. The polarizing editorials had a larger effect, perhaps demonstrating 
that such content may be more impactful. Note, however, that the depolarizing effect of the 






in general are less receptive to such messaging, or the difference may reflect the 
representativeness of the sample – namely, that the Republicans are not as extreme as the 
Democrats, as they consume more left-wing media than the Democrats consume right-wing 
media. Or, more simply, the supportive editorial vignettes were not equally persuasive from an 
“objective” point of view. 
 
Both reported consumption habits as well as the editorial vignettes give evidence that 
polarizing media may be increasing out-party hostility. The reported consumption results 
indicate that matched content may be making the situation worse, while cross-ideological 
content may make the situation better. These findings lend support to H2. The editorial 
vignettes show that, in an experimental environment, both critical media and supportive media 
may influence levels of affective polarization, giving support to H3 and H4. However, the 
supportive editorials had a slightly weaker effect, and the effect was concentrated among 
Republicans.  
 
Are there heterogenous effects of a polarized media diet, due to personality differences? 
 
The above sections have shown that personality can influence the type of news sources people 
choose to consume, and that ideologically polarized news consumption can increase levels of 
out-party hostility. An additional question is whether, or to what extent, individuals will differ 
in how polarizing news consumption affects them. In other words, are some people more 
responsive to such content? Does personality moderate the effects of news consumption? 
 
To test this, I ran models with interactions between reported news consumption levels and 






with personality traits. In both cases, there were no significant interactions. Hence, this paper 
cannot demonstrate any heterogenous effects of polarizing consumption. Given this lack of a 
moderation effect, there is no evidence for H5.  
 
There is some evidence, however, that one’s personality may influence how one judges 
polarizing media. After reading the editorial vignettes, the respondents were asked a number 
of questions about what they thought of the editorials. Respondents were asked if they thought 
the editorial was fair, persuasive, and offensive. They were also asked if it made them angry 
and if they trusted the author. Finally, they were asked to give it an overall rating. All of the 
items were correlated with each other, except for whether the article made them angry. That 
item was uncorrelated with the others when the respondent received the critical editorial. To 
get an overall picture of their response to the article, a scale was created using the means of all 
items, aside from whether the editorial made them angry. 
 
Regression models showed that extraverted individuals were found to judge the critical 
editorials more harshly than introverted individuals (b = -.152, p < .01). Although extraversion 
did not moderate the treatment effects, future research could explore whether extraverted 
individuals prefer less openly polarizing content. Given the small sample sizes here, the lack 
of statistically significant interactions may not represent the true lack of a moderation effect. 
 
What are the direct impacts of personality traits on out-party hostility? 
 
The main thrust of this paper is about how personality may influence news consumption 
patterns, which may subsequently drive levels of affective polarization. However, personality 






This survey has two ways of measuring hostility towards the opposing party: the adjective scale, 
and the thermometers used after the editorial vignettes. Table 2 displays regressions for both 
measures, with and without ideological and partisan control variables. Reported consumption 
was also included this time in the models, to focus on the direct effects of personality.  For both 
measures, openness is a significant predictor of hostility, but only in models without these 
control variables. Including the control variables, agreeableness is associated with less hostile 
attitudes and neuroticism is associated with more hostile attitudes for the adjective-based 
measure. Additionally, extraversion is found associated with less hostility for the party measure. 
 
Webster (2018) found extraverted individuals were less likely to have negative partisan affect, 
but conditional on having it, agreeable individuals were associated with less negativity. These 
results generally accord with those, providing evidence for H6 – that extraversion and 
agreeableness are associated with lower levels of affective polarization. However, the results 
here are not clear-cut. It is unclear why personality traits have different associations with the 
two measures. To remind readers, the two measures were correlated (r = .53), but hardly 
identical. Assessing the proportion of partisans with positive or negative traits is fundamentally 
different than providing one’s warmth towards the parties. It is quite possible that these three 
traits directly influence levels of affective polarization, however the degree of influence is 
dependent on the aspect of affective polarization focused on. Future research is needed to really 












Table 2: Out-party hostility 
 Dependent variable: 
 Adjectives Adjectives Thermometer Thermometer 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Treatment: Hostile   0.056*** 0.054*** 
   (0.020) (0.019) 
Treatment: Supportive   -0.033 -0.041** 
   (0.020) (0.019) 
Openness 0.088** 0.044 0.104** 0.018 
 (0.038) (0.037) (0.043) (0.040) 
Conscientiousness 0.055 0.053 -0.027 -0.0002 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.038) (0.036) 
Extraversion 0.022 0.033 -0.105*** -0.073** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.033) 
Agreeableness -0.074* -0.084** -0.020 -0.041 
 (0.039) (0.038) (0.045) (0.041) 
Neuroticism 0.111*** 0.115*** -0.023 -0.017 
 (0.037) (0.036) (0.041) (0.038) 
Republican  0.076***  0.079*** 
  (0.018)  (0.020) 
Ideological Extremism  0.097***  0.173*** 
  (0.027)  (0.029) 
Matched Consumption  0.100***  0.126*** 
  (0.036)  (0.038) 
Cross Consumption  -0.167***  -0.260*** 
  (0.039)  (0.042) 
Partisan Strength  0.090***  0.153*** 
  (0.033)  (0.035) 
Observations 847 847 749 749 
Adjusted R2 0.042 0.102 0.073 0.224 
Notes: OLS regressions. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Bolded when p<0.05. All variables 
min-max transformed. Demographic controls included in models but not displayed here. 
 
 
Taking the three relationships together, it is quite easy to provide an explanation for why these 






larger social networks and may therefore have more contact with members of the opposite party. 
Agreeable individuals are more friendly and empathetic and would therefore be likely to have 
more positive views of their political opponents than less agreeable individuals. Finally, 
individuals high in neuroticism would be more sensitive to potential threats and dangers and 
would therefore be more likely to have negative assessments of members of the opposing party.  
 
However, given the inconsistent results here, dependent on which measure is used, and the 
differences with Webster (2018), as well as the complicated nature of his two-step model, it is 
worth examining these results much more closely to understand how durable they are, and how 




The media environment we are in today provides us with many choices of where to get our 
news from. This affluence may come at a cost. We may be more inclined to consume partisan 
news and negative news – leading arguably to a destabilizing level of hostility between the two 
parties in the US. As individuals are unlikely to be equally predisposed to consume one-sided 
or negative news, our personalities become relevant in understanding these proclivities. We are 
also not all equally receptive to all messages, and some of that receptivity may be shaped by 
our personalities. Finally, beyond their relationships with news consumption, our personalities 
may directly impact how likely we are to be hostile towards the other side. This paper found 
evidence that one’s personality influences news selection and that news selection may partly 
drive levels of affective polarization. The effect of news consumption, however, was not 
moderated by personality. Evidence was found, however, that personality directly impacts 






Openness was identified as a possible predictor of cross-ideological consumption. This 
prediction flows naturally from the trait description. And indeed, open individuals claimed to 
make an effort to consume news which contrasted with their ideological beliefs. However, open 
individuals were not found to be associated with more cross-ideological consumption. Open 
individuals were also not found to be more or less likely to hold hostile views of the opposing 
side. Openness, as well as the other major Big Five predictor of political attitudes, 
conscientiousness, were both found not to be strongly associated with news consumption or 
affective polarization. 
 
In contrast, extraversion was found here to be related to both news consumption and affective 
polarization. Extraverted individuals consume more news, including cross-ideological news, 
than introverted individuals. They also report making an effort to do so. Additionally, when 
given hostile editorials to read, extraverted individuals rated those editorials poorly. That they 
rated polarizing media poorly supports the findings by Bachleda et al. (2020) that extraverted 
individuals seek out less negative news. Finally, according to one measure of out-party hostility, 
extraverted individuals were less hostile than introverted individuals. Extraversion has not been 
strongly identified previously as a major predictor of political attitudes – perhaps this is due to 
it playing a role in political moderation.  
 
Agreeableness was also found related to both news consumption and affective polarization. 
Agreeable individuals were more likely to have echo chamber-like consumption patterns and 
reported being upset by the news and disliking content which could be seen as offensive. 
Perhaps agreeable individuals seek out more comfortable news, which may mean more 






determine the reasons behind it. Despite this consumption pattern, agreeable individuals were 
found associated with lower levels of hostility towards members of the opposing party.  
 
Neuroticism was not found to be strongly associated with reported consumption patterns, 
though it was associated with getting upset by the news. Neuroticism predicted higher levels 
of hostility towards members of the opposing party. This trait was not previously identified as 
a predictor of such hostility by Webster (2018), but this finding is in accordance with the nature 
of the trait. Future research should seek to see how reliable and consistent this relationship is.  
 
Future research would add much to our understanding with better measurement of media 
consumption, ideally with accurate reporting of actual consumption patterns, instead of 
reported ones. Respondents are unlikely to have accurate memories of what they consumed, a 
major limitation of this study. By using measures of actual consumption, the influence of many 
more news sources could be studied as well. Future research could also include other 
personality and personality-adjacent measures, such as measures of cognitive style, as the Big 



















The mean response time for the survey was 775 seconds, however the standard deviation in 
response time was enormous: almost 3000 seconds. I chose to exclude individuals who finished 
the survey in less than three minutes, as that was unreasonably quick. A more major concern 
is that individuals did not read the editorial in the second part of the survey. Each individual 
was asked a question about the editorial they had read, to check whether they read the editorial 
carefully. There was a systematic difference in incorrect answers depending on the type of 
question asked. As a result, I excluded individuals based instead on the time they took to read 
the editorial. As the editorials are between 200 and 300 words each, careful readers, reading at 
an average reading speed, should have spent around a minute on the screen. Unfortunately, 
only around half of the participants spent that long. To allow for very fast readers, and some 
degree of scanning, individuals were filtered out if they spent less than thirty seconds on the 
screen.14 In total, 5 individuals were excluded from the total sample, based on their overall 
completion time, and a further 98 individuals were excluded from the editorial analysis based 







14 Some participants let me know that they accidentally clicked through the editorial screen. 
Thus, filtering out individuals who were very fast on the editorials from the entire sample would 






Table A1: Sample demographics after main filtering 
     
     n  (%) 
Party                                                                                    . 
Democrat    432  51  
Republican    418  49  
Gender                                                                                . 
Male     423  50  
Female    424  50 
Age                                                                                      . 
18-24     107  13  
25-34     305  36  
35-44     209  25  
45-54     114  13   
55-64     71  8  
65+     42  5 
Education                                                                            . 
Less than high school   8  1  
High school graduate   89  10 
Some college    190  22 
Two year degree   75  9 
Four year degree   345  41 
Master’s degree   117  14 
Professional degree   11  1 





























Table A2: Descriptive information for news consumption factors 
 
Factors and items    LW Factor RW Factor  
       
Loadings 
Left-wing        
Internet sources   0.31  0.06 
 
MSNBC    0.82  0.05 
 
CNN     0.69  -0.03 
 
Right-wing 
Fox News    0.05  0.54 
 
Talk radio programs   -0.11  0.70 
 
Breitbart News   -0.01  0.82 
 
Internet sources   0.05  0.77 
 
Religious sources   0.12  0.66 
  
Eigenvalue     1.58  2.57 
 
Proportion of variance explained  23%  37% 
 
Cronbach’s alpha    0.74  0.82 
 
Notes: Left-wing internet sources corresponds to: “Sources such as Slate, Buzzfeed, Daily Kos,  
or Huffington Post”, talk radio programs corresponds to: “Talk Radio programs like Rush 
Limbaugh or the Sean Hannity Show”, Right-wing internet sources corresponds to: “Sources 
such as the Drudge Report, Redstate.com, or HotAir.com”, and religious sources corresponds 
to: “Religious news sources like The Christian Post or the Christian News Network”. 
















Table A3: Detailed data on Democratic and Republican news consumption (%) 
 
News Source   1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
 
Democrats 
Several times per day  9 5 8 2 1 0 1 1 
Once per day   13 6 11 3 0 0 1 1 
A few times per week  24 17 16 6 3 2 3 2 
Weekly   14 15 17 6 4 3 4 3 
Less than weekly  26 32 31 20 12 6 10 7 
Never    13 25 17 64 80 88 81 87 
 
Republicans 
Several times per day  7 2 4 12 4 2 5 1 
Once per day   9 6 9 13 8 5 5 4 
A few times per week  12 11 10 19 11 5 4 7 
Weekly   11 8 8 13 5 7 7 3 
Less than weekly  26 25 25 23 21 15 20 18 
Never    34 49 44 19 50 66 59 66 
 
Notes:  
Source 1: Sources such as Slate, Buzzfeed, Daily Kos, or Huffington Post 
Source 2: MSNBC 
Source 3: CNN 
Source 4: Fox News 
Source 5: Talk Radio programs like Rush Limbaugh or the Sean Hannity Show 
Source 6: Breitbart News 
Source 7: Sources such as the Drudge Report, Redstate.com, or HotAir.com 


























Table A4: News consumption patterns (Fig. 3) 
 Dependent variable: 
 cross matched effort 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Openness -0.007 0.002 0.227*** 
 (0.036) (0.039) (0.048) 
Conscientiousness -0.032 -0.023 -0.003 
 (0.032) (0.036) (0.043) 
Extraversion 0.141*** 0.109*** 0.181*** 
 (0.029) (0.032) (0.039) 
Agreeableness -0.054 0.036 0.109** 
 (0.037) (0.041) (0.049) 
Neuroticism 0.016 0.041 0.045 
 (0.035) (0.038) (0.046) 
Ideological Extremism   -0.158*** 0.034 -0.038 
 (0.025) (0.028) (0.034) 
Partisan Strength 0.057* 0.242*** -0.115*** 
 (0.031) (0.034) (0.041) 
Republican 0.155*** -0.172*** 0.062*** 
 (0.015) (0.016) (0.020) 
Age -0.062* 0.199*** 0.036 
 (0.032) (0.035) (0.043) 
Male 0.024* 0.064*** 0.039** 
 (0.014) (0.015) (0.018) 
Income 0.050** 0.030 0.087*** 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.031) 
Education 0.137*** 0.126*** 0.007 
 (0.035) (0.039) (0.047) 
Observations 847 847 847 
Adjusted R2 0.278 0.254 0.115 
Notes: OLS regressions. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Bolded when p<0.05. All variables 










Table A5: Predictors of echo chamber consumption (Fig. 4) 
 Model: 
 basic full 
 (1) (2) 
Openness 0.072** 0.005 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
Conscientiousness -0.064** 0.005 
 (0.026) (0.020) 
Extraversion -0.037 -0.017 
 (0.024) (0.018) 
Agreeableness 0.123*** 0.047** 
 (0.030) (0.022) 
Neuroticism 0.050* 0.013 
 (0.028) (0.021) 
Ideological Extremism  0.101*** 
  (0.015) 
Partisan Strength  0.098*** 
  (0.019) 
Republican  -0.173*** 
  (0.009) 
Age 0.071*** 0.138*** 
 (0.025) (0.020) 
Male 0.017 0.021** 
 (0.011) (0.008) 
Income -0.045** -0.011 
 (0.019) (0.014) 
Education 0.044 -0.006 
 (0.028) (0.022) 
Observations 847 847 
Adjusted R2 0.051 0.461 
Notes: OLS regressions. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Bolded when p<0.05. All variables 










Table A6: Out-party hostility by consumption type and party (Fig. 6) 
 Party: 
 Democrats Republicans 
 (1) (2) 
Age -0.172*** -0.065 
 (0.053) (0.045) 
Male 0.003 -0.047** 
 (0.019) (0.020) 
Income 0.002 -0.062* 
 (0.034) (0.034) 
Education -0.034 -0.176*** 
 (0.052) (0.052) 
Ideological Extremism 0.099*** 0.089** 
 (0.037) (0.040) 
Cross Consumption -0.190*** -0.161*** 
 (0.073) (0.048) 
Matched Consumption 0.065 0.185*** 
 (0.045) (0.061) 
Partisan Strength 0.013 0.164*** 
 (0.044) (0.048) 
Observations 430 417 
Adjusted R2 0.057 0.163 
Notes: OLS regressions. *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01. Bolded when p<0.05. All variables 















Editorial Vignettes  
 
For Democrats - Attacks Republicans 
 
The Republican party is not what it once was. The party of Lincoln and Reagan, as they like to 
say, has become the party of Trump. In the speech which launched his candidacy, Trump 
claimed that Mexicans coming to the US were murderers and rapists. Since that point on, he 
has only continued to promote hate and xenophobia in the US. 
 
Soon after being elected, he attempted to completely ban Muslims from coming into the US. 
After the white-nationalist rally in Charlottesville, in which one protester was murdered, Trump 
said there were “very fine people on both sides”.  
 
However, the point isn’t just that Trump is a horrible person, the Republican party has 
embraced him. There is no major opposition from elected Republican officials. During the 
investigations into his corrupt behaviors, nearly all Republicans have stood by him. 
 
According to a Gallup poll in November, 90% of Republicans support him! This says it all. A 
corrupt, hateful, incompetent president is supported by 90% of Republican voters. They should 
be ashamed.  
 
Republicans will do anything to keep themselves in power. Selling out our democracy to 
foreign powers is perfectly fine. If they care about America as much as they say they do, then 







The sad thing is this, they are more and more a party of hate. Hatred towards foreigners, but 
also hatred towards their fellow Americans. Whether it's denying women abortions even if it 
puts their life at risk, or supporting police violence against African Americans, Republicans 
demonstrate that they stand against the United States and the principles which we should hold 
dear. 
 
For Democrats - Supports Republicans 
 
There’s a lot I disagree with about the modern Republican party, and of course Donald Trump. 
However, the media depictions of the party are often getting out of hand.  
 
Republicans make up about half of the electorate. They are your neighbors, your colleagues, 
your family. They aren’t monsters. Most of them are good, moral people. We might disagree 
with them about immigration policy, but that doesn’t mean they hate immigrants and are 
racists.  
 
Donald Trump has said some stupid and hurtful things, but his presidency has hardly been 
terrible for the country. Our economy is doing well, and African American joblessness has 
gone down. We are bringing troops home rather than getting into new wars. There’s still a lot 
which could be better, but things aren’t terrible. 
 
We should recognize there are many instances where Republicans have worked with 
Democrats to improve our country and help Americans. For instance, to combat the opioid 






things, greatly expands treatment opportunities to those addicted to drugs. This was passed 
nearly unanimously, and signed by President Trump. And this is but one example.  
 
President Trump also worked with both parties to pass the First Step Act which reformed the 
federal criminal justice system, helping to make the system more fair, to improve conditions 
for prisoners, and reduce recidivism rates.  
 
There is much about the Republican party we can disagree with - and should. But let’s not only 
focus on the bad aspects. The party is filled with many good people, and we should recognize 
that most of them are trying their best. 
 
For Republicans - Attacks Democrats 
 
It is sad to see what has come of the Democratic party. Their obsession with impeaching 
President Trump knows no bounds. Initially based on the Steele dossier, written by a dishonest 
British ex-spy, and funded by their own party, the Democrats wasted the first years of the 
Trump presidency, obsessed with impeaching him with no solid evidence.  
 
Even after the Mueller investigation confirmed there was no collusion with Russia, their 
attempts at overthrowing the democratically elected president of this country didn’t slow 
down.  
 
It is not Trump who is corrupt, but the Democrats. Joe Biden’s son was paid $83,000 per month 
while he worked for the Ukrainian gas company Burisma Holdings. Per month! Would he 






they getting in exchange for that? But when President Trump tries to investigate this, it is he 
who is considered corrupt.  
 
The Democrats have been consistently standing in the way of any meaningful improvements 
to this country. They oppose the president at every instance and are totally unwilling to 
compromise. But maybe this shouldn’t be so surprising.  
 
They have consistently worked against the American people. With sanctuary cities they have 
protected criminal illegal aliens from deportation, risking the safety of Americans. And those 
of us who complain about it? We are just a “basket of deplorables”.  
 
Democrats are not on your side. They are on the side of the illegal immigrant. They are on the 
side of the criminal. They are on the side of the lazy. It is honest, hardworking, law-abiding 
Americans which the Democrats don’t care about.  
 
For Republicans - Supports Democrats 
 
There’s a lot I disagree with about the modern Democratic party. However, among Republicans, 
some of the depictions of the party are getting out of hand.  
 
Democrats make up about half of the electorate. They are your neighbors, your colleagues, 
your family. They aren’t monsters. Most of them are good, moral people. We might disagree 







While Democrats have at times stood in the way of President Trump, we should recognize there 
are also many instances where Democrats have worked with Republicans to improve our 
country and help Americans.  
 
For instance, to combat the opioid crisis, Congress passed the SUPPORT for Patients and 
Communities act, which, among other things, greatly expands treatment opportunities to those 
addicted to drugs. This was passed nearly unanimously, and signed by President Trump. And 
this is but one example.  
 
President Trump also worked with both parties to pass the First Step Act which reformed the 
federal criminal justice system, helping to make the system more fair, to improve conditions 
for prisoners, and reduce recidivism rates.  
 
These are just a few examples which would not have been possible without support and 
cooperation from Democrats. 
 
There is much about the Democratic party we can disagree with - and should. But let’s not only 
focus on the bad aspects. The party is filled with many good people, and we should recognize 





















Political life in many democratic, Western countries is in a state of transformation, a troubling 
one. The previous chapters have dealt with two aspects of this transformation: first, a growing 
salience of immigration attitudes – becoming a prominent issue in many countries, and second, 
the emergence of high levels of affective polarization. As I discussed in the introduction, these 
should not be seen as independent from each other. The polarization around certain moralized 
issues, of which immigration is a prominent example, fuels affective polarization. The rise in 
ideological media choices available, as discussed in the previous chapter, combined with rising 
polarization, inevitably leads to other hazards for democracies. This can be seen, for instance, 
in lower levels of trust towards institutions, rising levels of belief in conspiracy theories, and 
the spread of “fake news”. Arguably, institutions themselves are struggling, which may help 
explain why trust in them has fallen. However, these problems will likely prove to further 
exacerbate institutional dysfunction. 
 
It may be natural to focus on larger, macro trends as the key explainers for the changes which 
are occurring. Much of the focus on immigration may be due to a kind of backlash effect against 
higher levels of immigration. Lack of public trust may emerge due to ineffective governance. 
Affective polarization in the U.S. could be driven in part by ideological sorting between the 
parties. And all of these relationships may be greatly worsened by the rise of polarized news 
media and the internet.  
 
Why then, should we look at personality? Our personalities are not unchanging, but they are 
fairly stable. I am not arguing that there has been a massive change in personality types, which 






important part of understanding these changes. If a certain debate or issue emerges as a large 
cleavage in a society, the personality traits which influence attitudes towards that issue will 
take on greater prominence than before. As our environment changes, such as due to the influx 
of large numbers of immigrants into our communities or through technological innovation, 
personality may take a different, and at times larger role in explaining divergent attitudes. Not 
everyone will respond to these changes in the same way. 
 
It is important not to freeze our understandings of personality based on the world of ten years 
ago. As the world changes, the role of personality will shift. It is possible moreover that we are 
moving into a world in which personality takes on a larger role than it had in previous decades 
– that is, maybe we are not merely seeing a shift from one trait being more relevant to another. 
An identity-based politics focused on moralized and emotional issues may lend itself to 
division based on individual sensitivities to particular emotions. Shifting away from an 
economically focused left-right politics may serve to increase the role of dispositional 
characteristics. 
 
Besides the specific contributions of each chapter, I hope this dissertation makes it clear that 
one’s personality is multifaceted, and the different aspects of our personalities each can have 
political implications. Sometimes the impact will be large, other times small. The links between 
traits and political attitudes may be direct, a kind of natural connection, or indirect. With that 
said, in lieu of a rather boring and redundant summary of the previous chapters, I would like to 
use this chapter to discuss some avenues of potential future research. This section will delve 








Understanding the roles of specific traits 
 
Early in my PhD, I presented a plot where openness and conscientiousness were shown to have 
mirrored effects for some political attitude. A professor commented to me that he guessed they 
were just opposites, doing the same thing but in opposite directions. Why was I showing both? 
Our descriptions of the traits often encourage that interpretation. Open individuals are open to 
new experiences, while conscientious individuals are closed off and traditional. Yet the two 
traits are often close to orthogonal. An individual who is high in openness is not the same as 
an individual who is low in conscientiousness, or vice versa. The confusion here belies a lack 
of understanding – both on part of the professor, but arguably the field.  
 
In his foundational book on the subject, Mondak writes: “[…] openness to experience partly 
represents the inverse of dogmatism. People high in openness to experience are not rigid in 
their views nor in the expectations they hold for others” (Mondak, 2010, pp. 52). This is 
followed by a description of conscientiousness in which he writes: “Concerning political 
attitudes, predictions for conscientiousness are roughly the inverse of those for openness to 
experience. People high in conscientiousness value personal responsibility, tradition, and virtue” 
(Mondak, 2010, pp. 54). A quick read of this and similar descriptions may lead people to the 
impression the professor had at my presentation.  
 
To remedy this, it is worth considering that these traits are well-rounded. Openness includes a 
propensity towards creativity and curiosity, and may be related to intelligence, although this is 
contested (Mondak, 2010, pp. 49). One may wonder, however, whether openness represents an 
openness only to certain experiences and ideas. One may also wonder whether some of the 






nature. Perhaps this explains the results in Chapter Four that open individuals claim they make 
an effort to consume cross-ideological content, yet this claim is not supported by their reported 
consumption levels. Furthermore, while conscientiousness is tied to a kind of traditional 
outlook, it is also tied to personal responsibility, and the trait may to some extent be measuring 
the ability to regulate emotions (Davis and Panksepp, 2018). Even if openness is linked to a 
kind of openness, and conscientiousness a kind of closedness – implying the professor was not 
terribly off – this does not imply these links are because of the same underlying reason. This 
distinction may be at times irrelevant; however, it may become very relevant for understanding 
certain political attitudes and behaviors. It is worth noting that in Chapter Two, despite both 
openness and conscientiousness being associated with immigration attitudes, only openness 
seemed to moderate the impact of neighborhood diversity. This is likely because openness and 
conscientiousness are influencing immigration attitudes in slightly different ways, and the two 
traits influence behaviors, such as forming a contact network, differently.  
 
The point of this story is that we need to have a much clearer understanding of how exactly 
specific traits are linked to political attitudes and behaviors. This implies we need to better 
understand the mechanisms behind these relationships. And to do that, we should go into much 
greater detail and nuance when exploring political relationships with personality traits.  
 
The chapters here demonstrate that a wide variety of traits can have impacts on the same 
measure. Chapters Two and Three both examine immigration attitudes, and they show that 
many Big Five traits have effects on immigration, as well as other measures such as RWA and 
SDO. If all these (and likely more) are having some impact, we need to get better at 
understanding what the unique impact each is having. Exactly how is each trait influencing the 






aspects of attitudes, such as Chapter Three did with disaggregating immigrant types, to see the 
origin-based discriminatory effect of authoritarianism. However, a simple step is to expand the 
range of attitudes asked about. This would help to understand the unique roles traits have. 
Expanding the range of outcome variables studied will likely demonstrate that traits we do not 
typically associate with political attitudes and behaviors actually do play important roles, as 
was shown in this dissertation. 
 
However, simply expanding the range of outcome variables, naturally runs into problems. 
Similar attitudes may be highly correlated, individuals are unlikely to understand why they 
believe what they believe, and there may be a great deal of noise. The range of methodological 
approaches should therefore be expanded. Perhaps more experimental methods need to be 
employed. Perhaps there needs to be greater utilization of longitudinal studies, showing how 
people with different personalities react to changes they encounter. Likely a variety of methods 
will be necessary to understand more precisely why particular traits are associated with 
particular attitudes, and the mechanisms which may lie behind. 
 
In looking to understand causal mechanisms, it is important to recognize the indirect effects 
that some traits may have. This is likely to involve traits which are not typically thought of as 
“political” traits. For instance, this research shows how a trait like extraversion, which has not 
been recognized as very impactful for immigration attitudes, may have a large effect in areas 
with large numbers of immigrants, likely due to increased contact rates. A decade ago, Mondak 
(2010) called for a better understanding of these linkages. However, much still remains 
unexamined. More research may find that personality traits which we may think of as relatively 
unimportant for political concerns may become relevant in different spheres. Personality traits 






Environmental impacts  
 
The overarching argument presented in the introduction and again in this chapter is that the 
political transformations we are seeing will affect the roles that personality traits play. The 
changes we are witnessing, however, are not distributed equally – which implies that one’s 
local environment is relevant to consider. Chapter Two shows evidence that personality traits 
interact with local immigrant levels, likely due to increased or decreased levels of contact with 
immigrants, to help form immigration attitudes. And although Chapter Four did not find 
evidence of an interaction between news consumption and personality traits, it showed how 
personality traits can affect news consumption patterns, a relationship that likely becomes more 
impactful where media offerings are larger.  
 
Recognizing the importance of environment reaffirms the call to expand the locations and 
contexts for (in this case) personality research. Much of psychological research has been done 
in a few Western countries (Henrich et al., 2010). This is also true of personality research within 
political psychology. A large step towards understanding the precise roles of particular traits is 
to expand the contexts in which these relationships are measured. A large meta-analysis found, 
for example, that while the relationship between prejudice and openness was consistent 
between North American and European samples, the relationships between prejudice and the 
traits of conscientiousness and neuroticism differed between the two continents (Sibley and 
Duckitt, 2008). This indicates what may seem like an intrinsic relationship may in fact be 
context-dependent, at the very least for the magnitude of an effect.  
 
Ideally, many different personality constructs should be tested in many environments and for 






the current changes which are taking place. Understanding where and under which contexts the 
role of personality may vary, can help us to avoid untrue blanket assertions about the universal 
roles of personality traits. Unfortunately, this dissertation is itself not very geographically 
adventurous – surveying the exotic locations of the United Kingdom and United States. 
However, future research can extend the ideas here to other locations and contexts.  
 
A more foundational rethink? 
 
This call for more nuance, more detail, and more outcome variables may therefore seem at 
home in a world with a wealth of personality and personality-like measures employed in 
political psychology. This dissertation uses the Big Five, as well as RWA and SDO. Beyond 
those are numerous others used in this kind of research, such as narcissism scales, disgust 
sensitivity, measures of cognitive style, and others. Umbrella terms like authoritarianism are 
measured in multiple ways: RWA and child-rearing values. There are multiple value-specific 
measures, such as the Schwartz Value Survey and Moral Foundations. Some of these measures 
which were intended to be used as single-dimension measures are being disaggregated into 
different components, as we did in Chapter Three for RWA.  
 
Is this not a blessing? Perhaps. Perhaps not. 
 
Were all these measures to be completely orthogonal to each other, and were it quite clear what 
each actually measured, there might be no problem. However, a large step forward for the field 







The Big Five emerged in psychology out of a time when there was a plethora of different 
personality scales. In part because the Big Five was, arguably, discovered rather than designed, 
and because that discovery was replicable, it became the standard personality measure. 
However, it is clear that the Big Five does not measure every aspect of personality. It is not 
specific enough to capture in detail all aspects of each trait, nor is it intended to.  
 
While the Big Five has been used for decades now in political research, similar measures have 
been developed to capture specific aspects of one’s “political personality” which may be absent 
or unemphasized in the Big Five. These measures have proven to be immensely useful and 
have clearly captured important aspects of our character which ought to be measured. That said, 
this abundance of different scales presents us with an analogous situation to that of early 
personality researchers. With a lack of clarity of what each measure is precisely measuring, 
and with high correlations between many of the measures, perhaps there is a need for a 
redevelopment, a restructuring.  
 
An approach forward could be to undertake a research program like that which developed the 
Big Five: using a tool like factor analysis to isolate the unique aspects of one’s political 
character. However, this would run into a frequent criticism of the Big Five, namely, that there 
is a lack of theoretical basis behind the traits (e.g., Block, 2010). This may be a larger problem 
than that which occurs with the Big Five. As one’s political personality is partly value-based, 
and is strongly affected by one’s environment, many of the factors which could emerge from 
this process may be the result of historical accident – in other words, not a true, unified, natural 
“trait”. Perhaps a way forward is through breaking down the existing measures into their 
component parts – understanding how they link together, and as advised above, testing these 






As was discussed in the introduction, there are sides of our personalities which are less directly 
political, and sides which are much more political. People have natural senses for things like 
justice and fairness. Currently we have a wealth of measures which likely overlap in the facets 
of our political personalities they tap. I would argue that the goal should be to distinguish these 
sides clearly from each other and have measures which directly capture one at a time. Ideally, 
these can be complemented with measures of the more value-free sides of our personality, as 
those clearly impact political outcomes as well, although often indirectly, as we have seen.  
 
The sum of all these suggestions is this: we need more clarity and nuance. Rough measures, 
with at times unclear mechanisms, will only get us so far. While the work done so far in the 
field has taught us a great deal about the various relationships between personality and public 
opinion, a large step forward would come from finer tools. These finer tools would clarify 
many of the relationships already discovered, and hopefully bring to light new ones. I hope that 
this dissertation succeeded in demonstrating that personality contributes to explaining the 
current political moment. And that the many sides of our personality play different roles. These 
changes we are witnessing provide an opportunity to see how people respond, in a different 
context, to new political problems. Although I have pointed out limits to the current approach 
to personality-based research, I hope that this dissertation helped to reveal some of the 
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